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THE NEW LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE: EMERGING
MARKET CAPITALIZATION: COUNTRY UPDATES PART I

A.

Economic Developments in Latin America

DR. CARLOS E. BERTAO'

In mid-1989, both the political and economic turmoil created by the
resignation of President Raul Alfonsin and the hyperinflation crisis,
established by the failure of the Primavera plan, devastated Argentina. After
his inauguration, President Carlos Menen introduced several economic and
infrastructure reforms. Those reforms were really remarkable. No one who
knows the history of Argentina could believe that such reforms could be
Mr. Menen restructured and privatized state-owned
achieved there.
all sectors of the economy, including the all-sacred
literally
companies in
defense sector.
The basic principle of his stabilization program was to attack the root of
Argentina's economic decline over the preceding years - the overextended
public sector. This was the basic problem of Argentina before the Menen
administration. Two main components of the Menen program are: first, the
structural reform to eliminate the public sector's deficit, divest its known core
functions, and terminate its inefficient interventions in the markets; and
second, the improvement in the supply of some public goods and services
crucial for the private sector's growth and social development.
I will list five of the main reforms made in Argentina in the last two to
three years - basically three years. The first one that I would like to call
your attention to is the divestiture of public enterprises. The first major
enterprises to privatize were Aerolineas Argentina, the airline company, and
Entel, the telecommunication company. Entel was divided into two
companies, Telefonica de Argentina and Telcom, which were sold to
Telephonica de Espafia and Stet-France Radio et Cable, France Telecom of
Italy. Also, television networks were privatized. More recently, other big,
state-owned companies have been sold to private investors such as: SOMISA
(Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina), the steel company, and SEGBA
(Servicios Electricos del Gran Buenos Aires), the power company subdivided
into Edenor, Edesur, and Gas Del Estado. In all sectors of the economy in
Argentina, the public sector is divesting its interest and keeping only its
regulatory function.
An interesting and sui generis case for privatization was that of the state
1. Carlos E. BertAo is senior counsel at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. He
graduated from the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro Law School in 1977. He
received his masters degree from New York University.
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railways, the Ferrocarriles Argentinos, which began in 1990. Before
privatizing the railway system, the government restructured the system into
three separate types of businesses: one responsible for cargo, another for
passenger movement, and another for metropolitan passenger movement.
Those businesses were then offered to the private sector. That included the
concession of the operation of the subway of Buenos Aires, one of the oldest
subways in the world. By the end of this year or maybe even earlier, it is
expected that the only major state-owned company that will still be in the
hands of the public sector will be Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF),
the state oil company. YPF downsized its workforce before it started
privatization from 52,000 workers in 1980 to about 10,000 today. It is
expected that another 2,000 workers will be laid off before privatization is
completed by the end of this year. YPF was transformed into a Sociedad
Anonima and its shares are planned to be sold at major international financial
centers before this year's end.
The second major reform was that of the public administration,
particularly the decrease in the number of public servants. Federal
employment was cut by more than 103,000 workers between 1991 and 1992,
helping to produce a 15% net reduction of the work force since 1990. The
tax collection agencies reduced personnel by over 13,000 workers and the
police force was reduced by almost 5000 people. In addition to that
reduction, approximately 284,000 teachers and health workers were
transferred from the federal government to the provincial government.
Rather than simply laying off workers, the economic plan called for
ministerial reorganization by ameliorating the provision of public services
delivered by the State. However, there have been significant costs associated
with these reforms. Between 1991 and 1992, the government paid about 320
million dollars in severance claims associated with them.
The liberalization of the trade regime was the third pillar of the economic
program of tht Menen Administration. In October 1991, the government
issued Decree 2284 which deregulated the economy and established the main
parameters of the economic reform and stabilization. The government's
policy, in terms of international trade, was twofold. First, it aimed at
eliminating existing protectionism by decreasing the average import taxes
from 80% in 1989 to about 15% in 1992. Second, the government strove to
suppress all quantitative import restrictions. Additionally, the government
eliminated red tape for importers as well as several subsidies, including the
special tax regime established before Tierra del Fuego. However, the tax
regime is being phased out by the decree.
The fourth reform, an important one, is the improvement in the tax
structure and tax administration. The reforms effected by the government in
the tax and customs administration helped tax revenues to increase by more
than 36% since 1990, to reach 25% of the GDP in 1992. In late 1989, the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2
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government enacted a uniform, universal value-added-tax (or VAT) on all
goods, and by late 1990 extended it to include all services. Coupled with
these changes, in February 1991, the DGI, the tax board, established a system
to control the largest taxpayers. It reviewed the tax lists between 1990 and
1992 by making more than 450,000 site inspections. In 1993, it is expected
that the tax authorities will have the capability to audit, check and monitor
the entire taxpayer base, which should reach 2.8 million by the end of this
year. The number of VAT taxpayers increased from 700,000 in 1990 to 1.6
million in 1992. The number of businesses closed by the DGI for VAT
violations went from a mere 750 in 1990 to 8200 in 1991. It is estimated
that around 18,000 businesses are going to be closed or penalized because of
VAT violations this year. The amount of audits performed by the DGI
increased by 179% in 1991, and by another 80% in the first eight months of
1992 in relation to 1990-91. This was all possible because of Congress'
1990 enactment of a law which provided sanctions for non-compliance with
the tax legislation. These reforms also were extended to customs. Since
December 1, 1992, the government began requiring uniform customs
declarations at its main port of entry, the airport of Ezeiza in Buenos Aires.
Responding to such reforms, the collection of import taxes has increased
threefold as a share of GDP from 1990 to the first semester of 1992. At the
same time, the average tariff coverage in quantitative restrictions fell.
The fifth main sector of reform is the financial sector. Of the reforms
here, the main pillar was the reform of the Central Bank Law that was
discussed for a long time in Congress. It went to the Congress in 1990, but
was not enacted until September 1992. The Central Bank Law completely
changed the ability of the central bank to cope with the new challenges of the
scenario in Argentina. This new legislation:
1. Establishes the much-needed independence of the central bank.
2. Proscribes direct lending from the central bank to the Treasury.
3. Limits the powers of the central bank to expand domestic credit.
4. Prohibits the issuance of interest-bearing liabilities by the central
bank.
5. Limits the use of rediscounts to emergencies consistent with the
"lender of last resort" function.
6. Removes some functions that were historically performed by the
central bank, but which were not consistent with its activities as a
monetary authority. An example of this is trade financing. In
accordance with this removal of power, the government recently
created BICE, a financial institution to foster exports from Argentina.
The decree establishing BICE also requires that BICE be handed to
the private sector at some time in the next two years.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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Before I explain the operation and the support of the World Bank for
these reforms, I would like to first explain an adjustment operation of the
World Bank. When the World Bank was created in 1946, its main purpose
was divided into two parts: a short-term objective and a long-term objective.
The former objective was to finance the reconstruction of the European
countries devastated by the Second World War. The latter objective of the
bank was to foster development in developing countries through financing of
development projects. In 1979, in the aftermath of the second oil shock, the
Bank adopted a new line of financing known as adjustment lending.
Adjustment lending was premised on two factors: fast disbursements and
policy changes in the loan recipient country. It was to provide the muchneeded financing for the balance of payment gaps in the countries which had
adopted stabilization and adjustment programs.
The adjustment programs supported by this type of lending are made by
either a set of comprehensive macroeconomic and institutional reforms or by
a limited set of sector-specific policy actions. The first set of actions is
supported by what we call Structural Adjustment Loans or Credits (SALC).
In the second sector, a related loan is supported by what we call Sector
Adjustment Loans or Credits - in the jargon of the World Bank, SECALS.
Disbursements of SALCS or SECALS are made against eligible imports by
the public and private sectors in the recipient countries and they are made in
tranches. The release of each of the tranches depends on the implementation
by the country of certain policy measures. These measures are determined
-to be part of and consistent with the overall macroeconomic program of the
country. Adjustment lending is important because after 1979, the World
Bank shifted into this type of operation. Adjustment lending is basically
what had been aiding our member countries, or some of our member
countries, in giving support to their adjustment programs. In Argentina, the
World Bank has provided four adjustment loans to support this program:
1. The Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Loan, PERAL, was
made on April 8, 1991, and amounted to 300 million dollars.
2. The Public Sector Reform Loan was made on August 13, 1991
for 325 million dollars.
3. The Second Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment Loan (PERAL
II), was recently signed on February 2, 1993, for 400 million dollars.
4. The Financial Sector Adjustment Loan of 300 million dollars was
signed on February 16, 1993.
Additionally, the World Bank is an active participant in refinancing the
external debt of Argentina and supports Argentina's debt service reduction
program. This program is incorporated into the document entitled "1992
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2
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Financing Plan" which has received strong support from the international
banking community. To support refinancing Argentina's external debt, the
World Bank is working with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Interamerican Development Bank.
They are providing financing for
Argentina's acquisition of collateral. This collateral will secure principal and
interest payments on the collateralized par bonds issued by Argentina under
the 1992 Financing Plan. Besides specific adjustment lending, in the last few
years the World Bank has made four technical assistance loans to Argentina
to assist it in carrying out reforms:
1. The Tax Administration Technical Assistance Project, for 6.5
million dollars, was signed on March 30, 1989.
2. The Public Enterprise Reform Execution Project, for 23 million
dollars, was approved and signed on April 8, 1991.
3. The Public Sector Reform Technical Assistance Project, for 23
million dollars, was signed on August 23, 1991.
4. The Second Tax Administration Technical Assistance Project, for
20 million dollars, was signed September 19, 1992.
The limited technical assistance loans of the World Bank, coupled with
the adjustment operations loans, support the balance of payment problems of
the country. They give more support for carrying out reforms introduced by
the macroeconomic program of Argentina. Complete technical assistance is
not provided by the World Bank - it only finances weapons, assistance, and
financial reforms.
The best way to conclude my presentation is to provide you with some
more data. In 1992, the economy as a whole grew by about 9%, up .5%
from 1991. Agricultural production reached a near-record level and industrial
production grew over 10%. Annual consumer prices rose only 17.5%, the
lowest inflation rate since 1970. Wholesale prices rose only 3.1%.
International reserves grew to approximately 12 billion dollars, the equivalent
of almost one year's worth of imports. A fiscal surplus was achieved,
independent of the proceeds from the sale of state-owned enterprises, mainly
because of the tax reforms described before. The bad news in this scenario
- we always have good news and bad news - is the trade imbalance. The
trade deficit for the first nine months of 1992 was about 1.5 billion dollars.
The total trade deficit reached approximately two billion dollars, making the
current account deficit for 1992 around 5.5 billion dollars.
The question remains open: how long can Argentina live this love story
with reform? Some would argue that this story is not a real love story, that
it only looks like a love story. To answer these questions and doubts, we
should look to the common saying used in Brazil, "Quem viver, vera,"
meaning, "Those who will survive, will see." Thank you very much for your
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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patience.
SIEGFRIED MARKS2

I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss some aspects of the
Latin American business outlook. I am sure you have already been exposed
and will continue to be exposed to a great deal of very positive news and
analysis about developments in Latin America. This is especially apparent
if we compare the current performance of Latin America with that of the past
decade and consider the policies of reform that most of the countries have
already implemented. Latin America has made surprising progress. I do not
want to dwell on these positives because I am sure you are going to hear
more about them. I would rather concentrate on some concerns that one
should still have about the Latin American business outlook. These concerns
focus on issues that, if they are not handled well in the next few years in
Latin America, could produce a negative situation again.
The first concern that I have is about the low rate of economic growth
in the region. While it is an improvement over recent years, the rate is still
much lower than that which Latin America is used to. Between World War
II and the world energy crisis in the early 1970s, the Latin American
economy on the average grew between 5% and 7% per year. The overall
weighted average growth rate in 1991 for Latin America was 3.5%. It
slowed to 2.4% last year. My estimate is that Latin America will achieve
only about 3% growth in 1993, excluding Brazil, which accounts for about
35% of the Latin American economy. Latin America had 4.3% growth in
1992, and I project that it will be about 4% in 1993. This sounds positive,
even if comparing it to European economies and the United States.
However, in the Latin American context, population growth rates mostly
range between 2% and 3% per year, very high levels of unemployment still
prevail, and income distribution is uneven. Thus, I would argue that a 3%
economic growth rate does not reduce the social problems in Latin America.
In fact, this growth rate could even contribute to further small increases
in unemployment. A main factor behind this consistent slow growth rate is
the low level of the rate of investment in Latin America. This low level of
investment is due to rising private investment levels and lower levels of
public sector investment by the government. This is because governments
are still very preoccupied with reducing public expenditures to continue to
lower the public sector deficit, a major cause of inflation and other problems
in the Latin American economy. Just to finish the first concern, we need to

Siegfried Marks is an economist specializing in Latin American issues. Mr. Marks'
2.
honors include having been a speaker at the first Miami Congressional Workshop in 1984,
where he briefed newly-elected members of the United States Congress on Latin American
economic conditions and prospects.
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watch closely what will happen with private local investment levels. The
private local sector still needs to raise its investment levels, as encouraged by
government interest rates and related policies that will affect the savings rate.
Encouraging developments in these two areas will clearly be reflected in
higher future growth.
There also are wide disparities between Latin American countries
regarding economic growth levels. As you probably know, last year Chile
had a 9.5% GDP growth rate, Venezuela a 7.5% rate, and Argentina a 6%
rate, while Mexico only had a 2.5% GDP growth rate, Colombia a 2.2% rate,
and Brazil a negative 1.5% growth rate. My estimate for this year is that
probably all these countries with high growth rates will experience a
significantly lower rate of growth. This will partly be influenced by
continued overvalued exchange rates.
My second concern is the Latin American trade balance. The overall
Latin American economy moved from a twenty-four billion dollar surplus in
1990 to an eight billion-dollar deficit in 1992. I expect this deficit to become
still larger this year. Again, there are wide disparities in the trade deficits.
The extreme case on the negative side is Mexico, where the deficit ballooned
from four billion-dollars in 1990 to nineteen billion dollars in 1992. I
estimate that Mexico's deficit could grow to as much as twenty-six billion
dollars this year. On the positive extreme is Brazil; the trade surplus there
increased from eleven billion dollars in 1990 to sixteen billion dollars in
1992. Brazil probably had the third-largest trade surplus in the world last
year. These general trade deficits in Latin America are added to the net
interest or net debt service payments on the external debt. Also added are
other smaller adjustments that make up the current account deficit, the
element in the balance of payments that has to be offset by capital inflows.
That current account deficit widened in Latin America from six billion
dollars in 1990 to thirty-five billion dollars last year. It is a substantial
deterioration in the current account balance.
Fortunately for Latin America, this widening current account deficit was
more than offset by an expansion in the net capital inflow: that is, money
flowing in various forms into Latin America from the rest of the world. This
net capital inflow increased from twenty-four billion dollars in 1990 to forty
billion dollars in 1991, and to a record and all time high of fifty-seven billion
dollars in 1992. Latin America had never experienced a capital inflow as
great as this one - not even during the height of external debt inflow into
Latin America between 1980 and 1981 that later caused the debt crisis. Of
course, here again, most of it is accounted for by the three major economies.
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina together accounted last year for forty-three
billion dollars of net capital inflow.
Obviously, I think some people will be surprised to see the apparently
poor relationship between economic growth and net capital inflow. In Latin
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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America, a huge capital inflow of fifty-seven billion dollars only produced
3% growth. Brazil's close to eleven billion dollar net capital inflows last
year produced a negative 1.5% GDP growth. Well, one explanation is that
foreign capital inflow is only a small, but significant, part of the total
investment in the economy. However, the low level of domestic investment
is apparent when large inflows of foreign capital do not help produce an
acceleration of economic growth in the overall Latin American economy.
If foreign net capital inflow is dissected, it is apparent that over 60% of
it is currently comprised of investments in stocks and bonds in the stock
markets of Latin America. I guess that probably less than 15% of the total
net capital inflow was actually converted directly into productive long-term
investments in Latin America. The rest were various types of what some
people call "hot monies" that flow in, attracted by very high short-term
interest rates. Some countries also have large inflows of drug money. A
good part of that drug money ended up invested in construction industry
booms in capital cities of countries like Guatemala, Colombia, and El
Salvador. In a few cases, there was a return of flight capital from businesses
making tax payments after the tax system was improved and broadened.
Money also flowed into the privatization programs that Latin America has
underway. However, this flow merely means that foreign money purchases
existing capital assets in the economy from both the local sector and the
government. The government used this money largely to reduce its public
sector budget deficit. Thus, it could resort less to inflationary deficit
financing. This type of investment does not produce growth. It produces
price stabilization in the economy.
A third concern that I have is related to the outward manifestations of the
second one: the deficits. My concern is that a relationship has developed in
many countries between the exchange rate, local interest rates, capital and
capital flows, and export development. The growing trade deficits in Latin
America are largely the result of the booming expansion of imports left
unbalanced by exports. Growth is anemic or stagnant or even declining in
terms of real exports. So this is another concern: that Latin America
currently has not yet been successful in developing dynamic export
expansion.
Only Brazil and Chile stand out with significant export
expansion.
Last year Brazil's exports grew from thirty-one billion dollars to thirtysix billion dollars, a five billion dollar expansion, despite a highly inflationary economy and a chaotic political situation. Chile for years has pursued
a clear, export-driven type of economic policy-making process, quite in
contrast to the rest of Latin America. Many people put Mexico and Chile in
the same bag, and now they are pointing out how both of them are really
doing well economically. However, one has to put them into separate bags.
This is because Chile really is the only larger economic country in Latin
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2
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America that has developed an exchange rate policy. This policy is designed
to help encourage both export diversification and the development of nontraditional exports. Some smaller countries in Central America are beginning
to develop the same type of policy. The rest of the area is really concentrating on policies still designed to achieve price stabilization. These types of
policies are especially important considering the destabilizing effect of
inflation on the economies of many countries recently. That effect, coupled
with the destroyed confidence by the private sector, created problems for
adequate budgetary spending in the socials areas, and so on.
Obviously, countries still need to devote much attention to reducing
inflationary rates. These inflationary rates are generally significantly above
the U.S. rate or international rates of inflation. The rates of inflation in Latin
America, with a few exceptions like Panama (which only had 1.2% inflation
last year) range between 15% and 30%. Colombia has had persistent
resistance in bringing the rate of inflation below 25%. The high rates of
inflation are partly due to the high interest rates that Latin American
countries maintain to prevent expansionary inflationary forces in their
economies.
These three check points are what one needs to follow and keep track of
to be sure that one understands whether the currently positive business
climate will really translate into something very stable. Thank you.
DR. JERRY HAAR 3

I would like to speak to you briefly about privatization in Latin America.
Rather than looking at the legal or technical aspects of it, I will give you a
survey of privatization and trends in Latin America from the vantage point
of having been a consultant to YPF in Argentina. At YPF, I was involved
with trying to improve their efficiency and effectiveness, readying them for
privatization. One of the things I want to highlight is that privatization is not
a zero sum game of different gradations of privatization in Latin America.
Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing trend toward privatization
throughout Latin America. To give you a sense of this trend, as of 1991
some of the top privatizers in the airline area were: Aviaci6n Mexicana and
Brazil's national airline, which were sold to locals, and Aerolineas Argentinas
which was sold to Iberia. There are other companies that have been or are
in the process of privatization. In banking, Banamex sold for 3.42 billion.

3. Dr. Haar is the Director of the Interamerican Business and Labor Program and the
Canada Program at the North-South Center at the University of Miami. Additionally, he is
a Senior Research Associate at the Center and teaches International Business and International
Marketing at the University. Dr. Haar is also an adjunct scholar of the American Enterprise
Institute in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. Cum Laude from the School of
International Service at American University, and earned his M.A. at Johns Hopkins
University. He was awarded a Ph.D from Columbia University in 1974.
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Bancomere is going to be on the auction block. YPF has been trimmed
down. Gasdestadoa, a very profitable operation, is going to be privatized and
spun off. For those of you who are animal lovers, the Argentine Zoo also
has been privatized. In Mexico, Cananeas, Mexicana de Cobre, public
works, and some Mexican ports have been privatized. In Chile, Argentina
and the Dominican Republic, mostly telecommunications have been
privatized. Mexico sold its phone system to Front Telecom and Southwestern Bell in the biggest privatization yet, the four billion dollar sale of
TELMEX. Venezuelan Candebe was sold and its services improved. Now,
instead of one in fifteen calls going through, one in nine goes through. That
is progress, experimental progress nonetheless.
Since the late 1980s, the restructuring of economic policies in Latin
America has, after decades of domestic investments and state-directed
enterprises, really been aimed at increasing the efficiency and effectiveness
of these enterprises. As Carlos BertAo and Siegfried Marks have mentioned,
Latin America is undergoing economic changes. This is after years of
stagnation under parastatal enterprises, the failed economic policies of the
1940s and 1950s, and a movement toward freer markets if not free market
economies. What are the reasons specifically behind these trends for
privatization of Latin America? One is the debt crisis, because states can no
longer afford to continue paying subsidies.
International lending sectors, multilateral lending institutions, are no
longer able to continue sustaining payments with parastatal enterprises
occupying such a huge part of the economy. That idea is a dream. For
example, I remember in the 1970s that the cost per barrel of petrol was
approximately fifty-five dollars when the world price was twenty-eight
dollars. This price could not be sustained, and lending institutions looked
with a jaundiced eye at these enterprises. No matter how attractive the
overall growth in a country is, parastatals are an absolute drain on the
economy, and at some point they will have to cease. Because Latin
American countries needed money for debt repayment, privatization was
viewed as a viable alternative.
The second reason for privatization in Latin America is the trend of the
failed import substitution development model. When experiments on this
model were done, there were valid reasons for it. However, this model
became so inward-looking and stagnant in its operation and output that it
failed, necessitating policy changes.
This movement awaited import
substitution both in Chile and Argentina. Argentina stopped privatization
between the late 1970s and mid-1980s and later began the divestiture again
of state enterprises. To President Menen's credit, he has done for private
enterprise what Nixon did in opening the door to China. As a representative
of a party on one extreme, he has made a 180-degree turn by validating the
legacy of the Peronistas when he really has done a yeoman's service of
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2

10

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8

Bertao: The New Latin American Economic Landscape: Emerging Market Capita

privatizing. I have been down there, and it does work. They are going about
it in the right way from what I have seen, although I cannot comment from
top to bottom. There are, however, some problems.
The main problem is that privatization can achieve absolutely nothing.
You sow the seeds of destruction for the notion of a free marketplace if you
simply transfer a monopoly from the hands of the government to the hands
of the private sector. A monopoly is a monopoly is a monopoly - whether
it is price fixing by a cartel or all the rest. We can fly round-trip between
Miami and Orlando for 430 dollars. However, with the privatization of the
airlines, internal transportation from Buenos Aires to Rosario is going to cost
you twice the fare of going between Buenos Aires and Caracas. This does
not smell right because a free and open market system is part of privatization
and should not be the end product. Things might come home to roost at
some point if there is a political change there or a regulatory body looks at
this very carefully and sees that the cost of privatization is too high of a price
for the people of Argentina to pay. So these are just concerns that will loom
large, and they are another reason why the Multilateral Development Bank
and similar banking institutions strongly favor reducing the government's role
in national economic policies.
The conditionality opposed by multilateral lending institutions is another
reason that the balance of payments and adjustment fund for privatization is
a determinant. It is part of the indispensable policies a country must follow
if it wants to remain in the good graces of the multilateral lending institutions. Another reason for the trend toward privatization is the demise of the
Soviet Union and the Cold War. Washington's economic policy from
approximately 1981 has centered on the so-called "magic" of the freer
marketplace. Not everyone has been a participant in that magic. Nevertheless,
it has set the tone for U.S. policy both domestically and internationally. The
privatization of the marketplace is definitely the trend, again, a break from
the past.
Another reason for privatization in Latin America is that many countries
realized that state-owned enterprises simply could not compete effectively
outside their protected markets. Even firms in Korea, Brazil, and Turkey that
wanted to compete worldwide for projects were simply unable to do so. This
was because the control, management and operation remained in the public
sector along with patronage, efficiency, and a lack of accountability.
The other factor in the trend toward privatization is that Latin American
governments began to use privatization to raise government revenue. Both
Chile and Mexico are good examples of this. From mid-1991, Argentina's
privatization program, as Mr. Bert~o mentioned, included the sale of the
telephone monopoly, the national airlines, and the petro-chemical industry,
netting the government of Argentina over 2.1 billion dollars. During the same
period, Mexico sold government assets, privatizing 2.4 billion dollars and
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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increasing its growth rate. Economists ask many questions about the fictitious
levels of the growth rate of countries that privatize their assets. For example,
even the favorable transworld debt service has been a function of the sale of
government assets. However, if countries decapitalize completely and do not
have massive inflows of funds, their statistics will not appear particularly
favorable. Certain growth rates and a store of dollars are possible if
privatization is accomplished by selling national assets.
However, what is going to be the second phase of this process? After
the initial 2.4 billion dollars of revenue from the sale of assets comes in, will
another 2.4 billion dollars follow? Will the privatization sales be made
because of sound policies that support high levels of savings, productivity,
and investment? If not, you are going to see a downward spiral. There are
many types of privatizations utilized in the past that many of you are familiar
with. The most common one is the public auction. It is used especially
when a country has a strong institutionalized capital market. Brazil is a good
example of where public auctions bend the prices. (In a second, I will get
into the attempt to sell Ouzi Minas and the resurrection of a sale under more
favorable conditions.)
Another path for privatization is through private tenders. It is a very
clever path because it limits bids for sale to investors who are financially
sound and capable of successfully operating the state-owned enterprise up for
sale. This type of sale is made in procurement processes around the world.
The criteria for a private tender is set. Financial and legal histories are
required in such a form that only about 80% of the applications received for
an enterprise or for bidding are going to be in the ballpark. One will not
receive a wide disparity of bids from institutions of dubious financial or
management quality that clog up the process to render a favorable decision.
Another trend is a type of debt-for-equity swap, a controversial option.
Traditionally, banks holding Latin American debt regarded these swaps and
their accompanying losses as reasonable tradeoffs. That was until many of
them decided they did not want to be in the real estate business, the movie
theater business, the hotel business, and all the rest. The banks then decided
to either take the hit of a loss or just simply ride it out. For example, the
Bank of Nova Scotia decided not to divest itself of any of its portfolio, not
to get rid of the slumps in the secondary markets. The recently retired
chairperson of the board, Cedric Ritchie, made this decision for the bank.
Cedric Ritchie is a world leader with an unblemished reputation. He said
that one of his greatest accomplishments in making the Bank of Nova Scotia
the most profitable bank in Canada is the fact that he rode out the downturn
of the market. The portfolio holdings of the Bank of Nova Scotia have been
tremendous because Cedric Ritchie said, in reverse of Newton's Law, that
whatever goes down must come up again. To his credit, he rode out the
downturn and stood out as a luminary in Latin America because he had faith
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2
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in the economy.
These debt-for-equity swaps also are a function of the inability of the
markets to reflect the real value of assets in their country of origin because
of factors such as the disparity in currency exchange rates. Nonetheless,
Chile was able to attract much capital through these debt-for-equity swaps.
However, we must realize that any organization that will swap its debt for
equity must have long-term faith in a country. Debt-for-equity swaps were
more successful, for example, in Brazil and Bolivia than they were in Chile.
Another type of debt-for-equity swap is the debt-for-environment swap.
This type of swap is not used that much, but could work well. For example,
if a wilderness society or organization wanted to set up an operation for a
couple of hundred thousand dollars in Costa Rica or another county and an
organization holds debt, it could probably sell it at a 15% discount to them.
The employee buyout swap also could function well. This is a very
attractive mechanism because Chile has used this type of a swap as a means
of assuaging political and labor concerns by enfranchising people. In the
United States, employee stock-ownership programs have worked fairly well.
They are a great way to prevent aggressive unions from coming in to disrupt
private enterprise.
Still another way is contracting out. That is where the government
decides it does not want to relinquish ownership of the business for
nationalist reasons, but rather it wants to retain control and improve service.
It is like having one's cake and eating it too. That is what is being done in
hotels in Poland, for example, and before that, in the oil industry as well. It
is done in the United States with schools (to some extent), sanitation service,
and other enterprises where control is mentioned in the contract. Where I am
from in Baltimore, the people have thrown up their hands in the school
system and decided they want to contract to the private sector. South Point
Elementary School here on Miami Beach operates in the same way.
There are many privatization options which one should consider. One
is the 100% private ownership. It is especially effective when an enterprise
is viewed as too much of a drain on the state, and the proceeds to be gained
from sale exceed the future benefits of retaining ownership. It is a
bottomless pit, a cost, a drain. The government does not want to do it. They
want to spin it off. This is the most common form of privatization emerging
throughout Latin America.
Still another method, a conservative one, is a joint venture between
private, foreign, and local investors. This will temper most domestic
concerns about imperialistic expansion. It is also what has been done with
Iberia Airlines in Argentina and Venezuela and in other countries where local
investors have teamed up with Iberia to jointly improve technology,
operations, and marketing. Like any joint venture, each partner has
something the other desires but does not have. This is a very common trend
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in Latin America.
The other is a joint venture between the government and the private
sector. This is a win-win operation. Chile and Peru are excellent examples
because they usually involve the national patrimony, mines, and natural
resources. In Spanish they say, "vender la patria," which means, "sell the
country." Having the government as a partner for political reasons is very
astute. The Mexican petro-chemical industry is going to invite contracts in
oil exploration, drilling, and extraction. This is because these skills exceed
the government's domestic capability of responding to develop new products
and methods of commercialization. This demonstrates that a country can
partially privatize. Another example of that is the Thatcher government in
England. They endorsed privatizing the telephone company and that favored
small investors or very large ones. Mutual fund ownership, tremendous in
Chile, and Capitalismo Popular allow one to bring smaller groups of
investors into a larger fund to develop ownership.
One of the things we do not have time for - probably one of the most
exciting developments in privatization today - is the pension fund. Chile
has privatized pension funds. Chileans must join a pension fund. They are
effectively run funds whose performance is outstanding. Mexico is going
through the same thing. That subject could take the time of a whole other
topic.
The last option is entire liquidation of an enterprise. There are different
countries' experiences that I cannot get into right now. In Argentina, you
have heard a little bit about a firm called CF, which increased its productivity
by 2000% annually through privatization. Brazil has had its ups and downs.
Other than Ouzi Minas, privatizations have been marginal. Brazil has not
been a total disaster in privatization and has made some significant progress.
If Brazil starts selling its major enterprises, there will be a significant inflow
of revenue into the country Chile has really been the success story in the
parastatal sector. The present government in Chile is focusing on employee
stock ownership programs. It is really developing this type of popular
capitalism which furthers the message of engaging the populace in private
enterprise.
Mexico is undergoing privatization as well. However, special considerations ought to be made before privatization is entered into. A number of
considerations are important: the domestic business environment, enterprise
clients, and familiarity with companies that will assume control. One of the
first things that foreign investors are going to look at is the domestic business
as a client. All monies going into Zurich and Miami could send the wrong
sign to investors who are looking at possible privatization schemes. Clearly,
domestic fiscal and monetary policies, economic conditions, and ideas which
Professor Marks mentioned are very important. Additionally, also important
to investors is, believe it or not, reregulation of the private sector. So, if a
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country is going to privatize industry, ironically, it has to reregulate or
regulate the economy anew. This is delightful for lawyers because it creates
billable hours, joint ventures with correspondent law firms, and all the rest.
In any event, this is what foreign investors are looking for.
Is it possible that the marketplace after a privatization occurs will be fair
and equitable? Related to this issue are those of trade liberalization, the
exchange rate, and preferential treatment. In comparison, when Canada
privatized it opened the marketplace and had no closed meetings.
Are all firms suitable for privatization? Governments have to prescreen.
This front end alignment is to determine whether certain firms are not worth
putting on the auction block. This is because doing so could be an
embarrassment, send the wrong sign, or impede the eventual sale of an
enterprise as desired. For example, social dislocations were discussed with
NAFTA, along with worker retraining. What is going to be the social and
economic impact of this? A government other than a military government
cannot just suddenly decide to privatize and dismiss massive numbers of
workers. The bureaucratic factor? Public education is important. In 1992,
the government of Colombia failed to get the cooperation of employees of
a state-owned telecommunications enterprise and experienced crippling strikes
led by the industry. A sales campaign should precede privatization. There
also is the sale of profitable companies like Gas del Estado in Argentina.
One has to sell the winners because no one is going to buy the low-priced
items or unattractive ones on the wagon if you are not willing to sell the cash
cows as well. Then, there is the rehabilitation of the state-owned enterprises,
making them ready for sale. Some perspective purchasers would discount the
price, saying let us modernize plant equipment, technology, etc. Others say,
no, let the seller get it ready and attractive for sale - like painting and
refurbishing a new home. This is being done at YPF. They are spending
alot of time to make YPF extremely attractive during top market prices and
making it ready to spin off.
Finally, there is foreign assistance. Governments have to carefully weigh
their own internal capabilities before they decide to deliver the privatization
process to foreigners. Unfortunately, Central America has been too eager to
engage the U.S. government in technical assistance and others in virtually a
wholesale operation to divest themselves of many enterprises.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

HERALCIo ATTENCIO: I would like to make a few comments - one in
relation to the macroeconomic adjustment program in Latin America. There
is a perception that the macroeconomic program is a short-term program and
there is a certain desperation: what will happen in the long run? In this
respect, especially, I would say in countries that have implemented the
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adjustment program, there is this desperation, as I said, about what will come
afterwards. What if what comes afterwards is a reverse of what has
happened in the short run?
Regarding growth rates, I think that Latin America is remarkable in that
it has produced high growth rates in many countries while most of the
Western Hemisphere is depressed. The U.S. growth rate will probably be
1.5% this year. The industrialized countries of the West especially use Latin
America as a traditional export market. If this is compounded with the
adjustment program, which has produced the interest rate, the industrial world
would have higher growth rates. The growth rates in Latin America probably
would have been higher than the traditional rates of the 1960s in many
respects.
CARLOS E. BERT.O: I think that you are a person who does not believe
in love stories, as I mentioned before. This is a big question mark for all
countries which have adopted structural adjustment programs. What will be
next and what will the reaction of our countries really be? Even from a
cultural standpoint, this involves not only a change in the economy, but also
a change in behavior. I used to joke with my colleagues at the bank which
has a private sector development division in the legal department. I used to
tell them, "Listen, I think you have to start retraining. You can still keep
your name, PSD, but maybe it's going to be a public sector development in
a few years." There is a question mark and I agree with your comments.
MARCO A. SAINZ, JR.: I wanted to particularly address this question to
Dr. Marks. I am not an economist. However, intuitively I have never
understood why economists are so horrified by trade deficits. Similarly, I
have never understood why economists have a consensus that budget deficits
are so terrible. It seems to me that if we look at America's own economic
history in the Nineteenth Century, we had enormous leaps and bounds of
economic growth. We were running tremendous trade deficits. It seems to
me that in your own examples of Latin American countries, they also
experienced tremendous economic restructuring and vibrant economies and
are running trade deficits. In Brazil, a very weak economy, they are running
a tremendous trade surplus. It is almost tantamount to saying that since my
neighbor has bought a new Mercedes, he has got a new roof, and he is
expanding the house; he must be running a trade deficit, and he must almost
be going into bankruptcy. Intuitively it does not make any sense to me.
SIEGFRIED MARKS: You are quite right; if one country has a trade
surplus, another country has to have a trade deficit. Obviously, not every
country can have a trade surplus. The problem that arises though is in the
Latin American context. The Latin American countries want to establish free
trade agreements, free trade. They are liberalizing, lowering import duties
and lowering import restrictions. I think these changes will require that they
become competitive internationally. They have to change their attitudes from
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2
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looking inward to looking outward. The reason that many Latin American
countries are not developing export growth at this point is because many
businesses still have the old mentality. This concerns me. The old mentality
prefers to satisfy the internal market. But, internal markets will be exposed
increasingly to cutthroat competition from imports as import duties are
lowered.
Therefore, if the Latin American private sector is to be viable in the
future with trade liberalization, it must operate as well in the international
market as in the domestic one. If they only concentrate on the domestic
market, they may be losing the domestic market and not become viable. This
is happening in many Latin American countries where they also are not
engaging in modernizing and streamlining their enterprises. They need this
pushing forward with wide-scale industrial modernization to also prepare
themselves to be viable exporters. I am not concerned, per se, with the trade
deficit. I am concerned with how the trade deficits are occurring and how
they show up in other policies.
DR. JERRY HAAR: I want to commend you on your question, spoken like
a true supply-sider. Do deficits matter or not? I think, just to follow-up on
what Professor Marks was saying, Brazil's trade statistics are an absolute
sham. This is because of, as was pointed out, Brazil's performance in the
export market as a percentage of its growth in GDP. You can see that it is
actually declining. It is miserable. Brazil on the other hand has a 158
million dollar internal market. There is not the same necessity to export.
Also, if you pursued policies over many years to choke-off imports, you can
arrange phony export statistics and a phony trade balance. This can show
what great exporters you are.
The question about the trade deficit really is whether it is due to
importing products of conspicuous consumption such as televisions, stereos,
portable gadgets, appliances, and all the rest? Or, is the country running a
trade deficit because it is pausing and importing capital goods to modernize
and develop worldwide competitive industries? If that is the reason for the
deficit, you are absolutely right. The same is true with cooking up phony
surpluses. Why would there be surges due to the exchange rate? They could
be due to firming up commodity prices, so I think you really have to look at
that very carefully. I want to thank you for your question.
GEORGE A. FOLSOM: Thank you. I would be very interested in hearing
which specific factors each panelist thinks in this process of structural
adjustment and investment liberalization is economically and politically
irreversible?
CARLOS E. BERTAO: Well, I think it depends on the case. You cannot
generalize an answer for a question like that. I do not think they are
irreversible. Latin America, as I said before, is not culturally used to
irreversible political or economic situations. We have had changes and shifts
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in our countries in the past, in this century. I think nobody could really say
that anything is irreversible in our countries.
SIEGFRIED MARKS: I think that whether they would be irreversible or not
will depend on whether the private local sector in Latin America will survive
and benefit from trade liberalization. If you have a free trade agreement
between countries and only one country benefits from it, very soon
afterwards you will have internal political pressures in the country not
benefitting from the agreement to revert to protectionism. It is very
important that the local private sectors and their governments still put policies
in place. These policies will enable and encourage the local private sectors
to revamp their attitudes, streamline their companies to reorganize internally,
and compete in the domestic market against liberalized imports. This is also
where the importance of exports is significant: to be able to go out and
increase exports to take advantage of economies of scale and, by that, lower
their unit costs of production. It also requires that governments make the
necessary investments in the infrastructure, for example, to modernize
transportation, to lower costs.
DR. JERRY HAAR: As I look at Latin America, I also look at the domestic
economic agenda in the United States, President Clinton's plan. You can
almost see a mirror image. I think that the different regiments necessary for
free trade, the economic experiments to be engaged in to open markets, to
improve savings, productivity and investment - I think we know them.
They will fail and the notion of capitalism also will fail. It only exists in
Latin American traditional micro-enterprises, the underground economy
working off of the books. It does not exist at national state enterprises where
the private sector, large companies, survive at the behest of the government
and are in collusion with them. These experiments will fail if social issues
are not addressed. You have social time bombs such as, "go to the favelas
[in Brazil]," and, "go to the ranchos [in Venezuela]." This social time bomb
is like that in our inner cities. It is in the private sector's best interest to
address these social issues both in the United States and in Latin America.
In Mexico, every year there are 1.2 million new entrants to the job market,
but there is no political tranquility, meeting of social needs, or curbing of the
population growth rate. There is not a country on the face of the earth that
is going to be able to develop technology that is capital intensive, not labor
intensive, to absorb all of that. That is a social time bomb waiting to go off.
It will result in an apocalyptic scenario. The heavy hand of government and
people like Cardenas and Lula, excuse my editorializing, will come in. You
are going to go back to a 1930s kind of Latin American jingoism where the
state is everything. I think that this is something to fear quite a bit. There
is a need to focus on the infrastructure of the social infrastructure and the
physical infrastructure as well.
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Emerging Financialand Capital Markets

MR. DARIo PEDRAJO 4
I would like to spend this time talking a little bit about the period of the
1980s to today. During that time, two distinct periods of economic programs
and agendas were followed in Latin America. Their effects and how the
capital markets related to them are important. These two periods can be
roughly divided into the Baker and Brady periods. The Baker period, that
of U.S. Secretary of State Baker, started in 1985 following the debt crisis of
1982. It returned with the Brady period from about 1989 onwards to today.
The Brady period reflected a period in which a large component of the
commercial bank debt in Latin America was converted into securities. It was
the means by which the external debt crises of the various economies in
Latin America were resolved. We will be touching on some points of the
prior speakers in talking about this period, but I hope you will bear with me
through that.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Latin American countries
attempted to develop their economies via public sector projects, financed
almost exclusively through commercial bank borrowing. Additionally, the
scheme of economic development in Latin America discouraged the
development of capital markets via such things as restrictive import policies,
currency controls, and foreign investment restrictions. The idea, fostered by
Latin American governments, was that the country could turn in on itself.
It could finance itself almost exclusively through commercial bank borrowing
while building up the economies via the public sector. In mid-1982, the cost
of borrowing grew because of increasing interest rates, compounding
inefficiencies in the public sector, and rapidly falling prices of oil. All of
this affected both Mexico and Venezuela and ultimately resulted in Mexico
declaring its inability to pay its debt. Soon after that, most Latin American
countries followed and what was known as the Latin America debt crisis of
the early 1980s was born. During this period, Latin American capital
markets consisted almost entirely of short-term local currency debt issued
predominantly by the government. In the stock markets, virtually no
marginal capitalization and liquidity existed. This was combined with
foreign ownership restrictions and other hurdles for investors. It meant that
in Latin America, at least until about five years ago, capital markets were
very small and domestic. Literally no equity-type permanent capital
investment existed. Extremely short-term borrowing via the money markets
predominated.

4. Dario Pedrajo is the Vice-President of Vestrust Asset Management Corporation of
Miami, Florida.
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The initial solution to the debt crisis was the so-called Baker plan. This
was following the virtual collapse of the Latin American debt market that
then exceeded over four billion dollars in commercial bank lending to the
various countries. It was really what one would call a "Band-Aid" approach
to carry these countries through a temporary credit problem resulting
primarily from temporary high interest rates. Secretary Baker encouraged
banks to renegotiate existing debt to lengthen their maturities. The world
banks agreed, reluctantly, because they lacked the necessary loan reserves
and needed to buy time to shore-up these reserves. In effect, this only
exacerbated the problem. These countries were not really encouraged to
implement substantive fiscal and monetary reforms or to develop alternate
funding sources via domestic and international capital markets. Simultaneously, banks refused to increase lending in the face of worsening economic
conditions. There was a very tight period of credit. The capital markets
really did not develop substantively during this period. There were by world
bank standards huge outflows of capital. This was the so-called flight capital
period where the negative capital flows in Latin America became alarming.
By 1989, we moved into a workable period through a combination of
factors. One was that the banks were really in a. position at this point to
begin to forgive debt. They could bring countries back on track with their
commercial lending problems by making a one-time debt forgiveness. After
this, they took the remaining debt and converted it to long-term debt
securities, the so-called Brady Bonds. Fortunately, governments were
changing in Latin America and new leaders emerged such as President
Salinas of Mexico and President Menen of Argentina. The various
governments really began to change their view toward what needed to be
done. But again, in the early part of this period we still see essentially
negative capital flows into the area and a shrinking economy with very high
inflation rates.
Inflation rates really continued to increase right until about 1990. The
dramatic example of course is Argentina. Argentina in 1990 had inflation
above 5000%. Today it is at 17.5%. This is a dramatic change. Simultaneously, with banks entering Brady-type of debt-reduction schemes, this
philosophical change in the new governments in Latin America began to have
some dramatic macroeconomic effects. There was really a 180 degree
turnaround from the economic policies of the past. Countries moved away
from the import substitution scheme of high tariffs to a lower tariff-rate,
export-driven type of privatization scheme.
Privatization has been talked about at length. For example, the sell-off
in Argentina of practically every component of the public sector has
completely changed its face. I think it bears mentioning that while Mexico
and Argentina are good examples of privatization, we still have Brazil, the
largest country in Latin America. Brazil is a country roughly equal to the
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size of the United States, although it has a slightly smaller population. In
Brazil, 70% of the economy is still part of the public sector and highly
inefficient, with few exceptions. The same is said, but not as dramatically,
for Venezuela and other Latin American countries. Some other countries that
have not been discussed are going through some dramatic changes. Peru, for
example, has very aggressive privatization underway.
Capital markets began to develop in Latin America at this time. This is
because Brady Bonds, in long-term government securities collateralized with
U.S. Treasury zeros, began to capture the attention of international investors.
They wanted to jump on the bandwagon as the economies were beginning to
turn around. This was because there were very small capital markets for both
equity and fixed income in these countries, and they were the only game in
town. So, in the period from about 1989 forward, you see a very active
Brady Bond market begin to develop.
Since 1989, all the major Latin American countries have implemented
these open door policies to encourage investment in their local capital
markets. That is part of the overall scheme. Besides the implementation of
privatization, trade, and so forth, the local capital markets have been opened
substantially. Today, foreign ownership restrictions and foreign exchange
controls have been eliminated or significantly reduced in most of the Latin
American countries. Eurobond and ADR programs that commenced in Latin
America since 1990 have widened the investor base and added liquidity to
fixed income and equity issues in that region. The improved macroeconomic
conditions that have followed from these changes have reduced foreign
exchange and inflationary concerns, which are major concerns of foreign
capital coming in as investment. I will spend some time talking about fixed
income markets.
The fixed income market is, even today, the most common form of
investment in Latin America. Today, I would say it accounts for close to
90% of total investments flowing into the area in the last three years. We
can break the fixed income market into three distinct categories today. First,
Brady Bonds are exclusively sovereign issuer bonds with average lives often
to thirty years, and for the most part collateralized with U.S. Treasuries.
Second, there is the Eurobond and medium-term local instrument market,
which includes both sovereign and private sector issues with average lives of
two to ten years. Finally are U.S. dollar and local currency money market
instruments with average lives of under two years. Within this group, we
include an important component in the last couple of years, commercial paper
and certificates of deposit coming from the private sector.
The Brady Bonds are, as I mentioned, the most liquid fixed income
investments in Latin America today. They represent over 120 billion dollars
of restructured commercial bank debt and are currently traded actively by
dealers and brokers, primarily in New York and London. This continues to
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be probably the main instrument of choice, especially in the institutional
investor market.
If we track the Brady periods, the bonds were implemented in Mexico
at the end of 1989, and Venezuela soon followed in 1990. On April 7, the
Argentine Brady Bonds were issued. They have been trading on an "if and
when" issue basis for the last six months. Brazil recently attained 96%
approval of their bank creditors to implement a plan within the next six
months for a Brady plan there. In each case, one can track the deterioration
of the price of the commercial bank or the increase in its discount. It was
actively traded pre-Brady. It grew from 1984 when the markets rose until
the Brady period. Immediately upon the implementation of the Brady plan,
these discounts begin to diminish and prices started to rise. The oldest Brady
period started in Mexico. If one were to track it back to last year, you would
see that it has spread traded bonds much like corporate bonds in the United
States. In other words, because of the confidence level in what is happening
in Mexico, the Mexican Brady Bonds trade at a fairly narrow 240 to 260
basis points spread over the comparable thirty-year U.S. Treasuries. That is
a good indication. It usually tells you that it is beginning to trade on a better
perceived credit quality, it is stable, and it establishes a benchmark for the
country. This is something that Mexico has been very aware of, and has
done a very good job. They used the thirty-year bonds to start building a
curve for the other government issues from a very short term to a long term.
That essentially creates a confidence factor in international investors. It is
very important in order for them to develop their capital markets. Basically,
the second component is a much newer component.
Latin America, primarily the public sector, had not been accessing the
Eurobond market in a very significant way in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
After the 1982 debt crisis, the Eurobond market literally evaporated. There
were no issues again out of Latin America until 1989. In fact, the bulk of
the issues in the Eurobond market has been in 1991 and 1992. In about
1991, the Eurobond market grew from practically nothing to a level of thirty
billion in terms of private sector issues, predominantly financial issues which
are issues from banks and other financial institutions in Latin America. In
1992, that market grew. There were new issues. Over fifty billion were
underwritten. Again in 1991, the main issuers were Mexico, Venezuela,
Brazil, predominantly Mexico and Brazil. In 1992, we see the important
addition of Argentina, as the Argentine turnaround begins to capture investor
interest. Again, this market is primarily dominated by financial issuers in the
private sector or by parastatals. For example in Brazil, if you look at the
Eurobond Market you will find that practically every major Brazilian bank
has issues out there. There are probably only four or five nonfinancial
companies that are issuing Eurobonds. Eurobonds are becoming the
preferred issue of the retail client base for Latin America and fixed income
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investments. This is predominantly because of the shorter tenures of the
bonds, their perceived liquidity, and the ability to buy small lot sizes.
The third component in the fixed income market is the money markets.
The money markets in Latin America are still primarily the domain of local
investors, except in Mexico. In Mexico, the money markets are ample. They
trade over forty billion instruments, have a very high level of liquidity, and
have yielded extremely high dollar returns that have attracted investors. The
primary issue in the money markets in Mexico is the Mexican treasury bill,
issued in 28-day, 91-day, 182-day, and one-year tenure. They are issued via
weekly treasury auctions, similar to the U.S. market.
Basically, what Mexico is doing in the market is quite curious. They
have reduced the amount of issues of short-term issues dramatically in the
last two years. Why? Governments are moving away from funding
themselves on a short-term basis. They are trying to move up the curve and
develop, quite consciously, a broad capital market and a longer tenure so they
can plan their economies much more efficiently. If you are trying to
implement five-year strategies in a government and your main source of
income is twenty-eight day paper, you can readily see what kind of problems
you might have.
Mexico has been the model. Mexico is really the only liquid money
market right now in Latin America. However, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile,
Brazil, and other countries will begin to move down the curve, so to speak.
They will establish deeper and deeper markets in local money market
instruments. The markets will be two to three years of a one to three-year
period, let us say, so they can plan their economies better. In the money
markets, most of them, including those in Mexico, remain mainly the
domains of local investors. One reason is the high amount of volatility
primarily related to foreign exchange fluctuations, not to interest rate
environments. If you look at moments in time, particularly last summer
when Ross Perot said he did not think NAFTA was a great idea, you can see
tremendous, negative returns from one month to the next. Mexico is the best
example, the most stable example.
These markets are still extremely volatile. They are very difficult for
foreign investors who are not on top of what is happening with the country,
in terms of foreign exchange fluctuations, to invest in other than a managed
account or mutual funds. Many of these funds have been created abroad and
at home mainly for institutional investor markets. The equity markets in
Latin America, which I would like to move on to, have been really the
slowest to benefit from the post-Brady reforms. This is mostly because of
lack of fundamental research in this area necessary to make informed
investment decisions. Nonetheless, substantial increases in ADR programs,
local market capitalization, and trading volume have all contributed to
renewed investor appetite for equity issues. That is predominantly so with
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the institutional investor market. A classic way of looking at it is market
capitalization versus GDP., Even with very strong growth and GDP's in
Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela, Venezuela (which has had all the political
problems of the increase in market capitalization) has outstripped GDP
growth. Absolute market capitalization figures are even more impressive, I
would say. In the equity markets, from virtual negligible levels of market
capitalization until 1990, there have been substantial increases. There are
probably fifty to sixty billion dollars in market capitalization in Mexico, the
most dramatic increase. Similarly, there have been impressive increases in
Argentina and Venezuela. In Brazil, because of the failure to reform the
economy, there has not been the kind of market capitalization growth seen
in other countries.
Interestingly enough, a phenomenon in the equity markets is that there
was a boom in 1991 in Latin American equity issues. Price/Equity (PE)
ratios rose to levels up to thirty and forty times earnings. In 1992, there was
a bit of a slide because earnings in most of the blue-chip companies sought
after by international investors grew dramatically. However, the stock prices
in the markets had not grown. Actual PE ratios dropped from their lofty
levels of the 1991 year-end to an average of about fifteen for the blue-chips
now. As an investment house, it will tell us that since macroeconomic
conditions remain favorable, there will be an increasing investor appetite in
this component of the market. It will represent the institutional investors that
have been coming into the equity markets, the best emerging market value
today. Again, another reason the equity markets have started to become even
more interesting to international investors has been the daily trading volumes
on the exchanges. I remember that perhaps as little as a year ago the daily
trading volume of equity in Argentina was under two million dollars a day.
Last year, probably the average was around 60 to 80 million a day. That is
a very important number for institutional investors who are looking for good
liquidity in the local markets.
CARLOS MENDEZ-PEATE'

In the interest of time and keeping up with the program I am going to
truncate my chat a little bit. Essentially what Dario and I were asked to
speak about is a very large topic. The emerging Latin American financial
and capital markets encompass many diverse developments. The former, the
financial markets, include tremendous development in banking and
modification of banking structures throughout Latin America. Dario spoke
about the latter, capital markets. But I look at the subject of Latin American

5. Carlos Mendez-Peflate is an attorney with Morgan Lewis & Bockius in Miami,
Florida.
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capital markets as really encompassing three different types of markets.
Dario has alluded to that on a financial footing.
The first market that I see in Latin American countries is the stock
exchange. Progress has been made in increasing their activity, their volume,
and so forth. The second capital market that I see for Latin America is really
the Eurodollar market. This market offers primarily fixed income securities
to investors both outside the United States and Latin America. The third
capital market is really the U.S. market; that is, the market in the United
States for Latin American debt and equity securities. With all of this in
mind, and recognizing those three markets, what I Would really like to focus
on are the first of these markets: the local setting, the stock exchanges in
these countries, and the offering of securities throughout the region. Again,
in the interest of time I really want to focus on the key countries - that is,
the countries that for the moment at least have shown the greatest growth in
volume and market capitalization. I think Dario has already told you what
they are.
I would like to focus on Mexico, Chile (a well-developed market), and
Brazil. If we have time, we will go on to other markets. Generally, all these
countries have had brokerage houses and similar institutions for a great deal
of time. The Sdo Paulo stock exchange was founded in 1890 and the one in
Rio in 1845. The stock exchange in Santiago, Chile is well over 100 years
old. The market concepts that we are talking about are certainly not new in
these countries. However, the volume, the activity, and the amount of
activities in each of these countries are new. As a general proposition, each
of these countries has a well-developed securities regulation regime. In
Brazil, the Comisi6n de Valores, the CVM, is the body that regulates the
activities of securities dealers. In Mexico, it is the National Securities
Commission. These regulators are very rough, but I think it is fair to say
that they are similarly constituted to our own Securities and Exchange
Commission. They increasingly take a more active role in regulating the
markets. For many historic reasons that you have heard this morning, the
activities in these stock exchanges were not of great interest until quite
recently. Of course, there are substantial economic reasons that I will not
delve into any further about why this has happened. I would like to show
you, from a legal point of view, a bit of how some of these countries have
changed their legal regimes to encourage foreign investments. This has led
to the amount of activity that you see today. I would first like to talk about
Mexico.
Mexico, as of the end of 1992, had about twenty-six brokerage houses,
which are regulated by the National Securities Commission. They strictly
regulate anyone making what is called a public offer of securities in Mexico.
We have been involved in advising U.S. securities houses who are going into
Mexico or contemplating going into Mexico. Essentially, it is a very closed
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regime, at least for the moment, and tightly regulated. The provisions of
NAFTA, which I think will be discussed later in this seminar, will hopefully
open the Mexican securities business significantly between now and the year
2000. There are specific commitments by Mexico to allow the gradual
increase of foreign securities brokerage activities there. If NAFTA is
approved, I anticipate after the year 2000 there will be intense competition
in Mexico in the securities business. That market is being deregulated, but
the real story of how Mexico has opened foreign ownership in Mexican
corporations is about changes they have made in their laws. To understand
what has happened there, I think you have to back up little bit and talk about
the restrictions of foreign investment in Mexico.
Mexico traditionally has been a restrictive country for foreign investment.
The Mexican constitution reserves to the Mexican state a substantial list of
industries, including the oil industry, basic petro-chemicals, nuclear energy
and railroads to Mexican state control. In 1973, Mexico enacted a foreign
investment law to promote foreign investment in Mexico. Unfortunately, it
had tremendous amounts of strings. It also reserved to Mexican nationals
substantial industries which are of interest to capital market investors such
as telephones and railroads. At one point, Mexico had over a thousand
industries that were state-controlled, including some restaurants. So, the
1973 statute was well-intentioned but very restrictive.
The real change did not come in Mexico until 1989, when regulations
were promulgated to the 1973 statute to further liberalize and encourage
foreign investment. In 1989, they dropped many industries in fields of
economic activities restricted to Mexican nationals and allowed foreigners to
come in directly. The other big change is that the Mexican government
allowed the use of trusts and other devices for foreigners, even in industries
where restrictions on foreign investment continued - I will explain how that
works in a minute. A concrete example of what I am talking about is the
Telkphonos de M6xico (TELMEX) transaction. The privatization of
TELMEX, which closed in May of 1991, was a one billion dollar transaction.
It was a landmark transaction for securities in Latin American. The law in
Mexico forbids non-Mexicans from owning more than 49% of the capital
stocks of a Mexican corporation engaged in the telecommunications business.
Tel6phonos de M6xico, of course, is such a company. That continues to be
the law. You might ask how the TELMEX deal was offered to the public or
how the public, especially the non-Mexican public, was able to participate.
The transaction was done in three different steps.
Step one was for a consortium of both Mexican and non-Mexican
companies, led by Southwestern Bell and French Telecom, to purchase 51%
of the outstanding capital stock of Tel6phonos de M6xico. Then they
purchased so-called double-A shares, which are voting shares. But, they did
not buy them directly. They bought them through a Mexican trust whose
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beneficiaries were these companies that I have mentioned. Thus, they
acquired a 49% control of Telkphonos de Mexico. The beauty of the trust
is that it is a Mexican trust. Therefore, it is a citizen .of Mexico and is not
a foreigner coming into Mexico. It does not get much more sophisticated
than that.
The second step was to raise money in the international markets to
modernize, to buy out part of the government's stake in TELMEX, and to
modernize the corporation. This is a public offering, which happened in May
1991. There was an issuance of so-called L-Shares. L-Shares are, simply
speaking, a restricted class of stock. It is a class of stock entitled to
dividends as the company pays them out to all share holders. It has very
limited voting rights: to vote on mergers, delisting the stock from a stock
exchange, or modifying the company in a substantial way. The L-stock was
issued and essentially sold to the public in this stock issuance. The L-shares
have become very popular in other industries that I will get into in a minute.
Issuing the L-shares enabled them to comply with the Mexican restrictions
on foreign ownership and yet at the same time raise substantial amounts of
capital.
Step three of the transaction is to go to U.S. capital markets, one of the
largest stock capital markets in the world. This is done through the
American Depository Receipt mechanism. That is, L-shares are deposited in
a U.S. bank and receipts are issued for the L-shares. These are called
American Depository Receipts (ADR's), which back up the L-shares. Then,
the ADR's are sold to American investors, in compliance with the Securities
and Exchange Commission rules, since they were primarily institutional
investors. With this transaction, you have tapped the Mexican, European,
and U.S. markets without violating the Mexican restrictions on foreign
ownership.
The TELMEX transaction was a successful one. The use of L-shares is
very popular as well in the banking context. In June 1992, Mexican banking
law was amended so that Mexican banks could issue L-shares with the
approval of the Ministry of Finance. Mexican banks again are restricted in
their foreign ownership to approximately 30%. The L-shares issued do not
count toward the 30% so they enable Mexican banks to issue shares abroad.
In this way, Banco Creme and other banks in Mexico have issued L-shares
and have increased their capitalization substantially. That is one way that
Mexico has legally and ingeniously attracted foreign investment and I think
it has been rather successful.
Another common feature in these offerings is the use of what are called
ordinary participation certificates, known as "CPO's." Again, this involves
the use of a trust. A corporation facing these restrictions which wants to
comply with the restrictions on foreign investment but still wants to raise
money will set up a trust. Typically, a Mexican development bank, the
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Nacional Financiera (NaFine), will set it up. It is a government entity and
the trust will act as trustee for certificates that in turn represent an interest in
shares. The trustee will issue certificates representing an ownership interest
in these shares that it holds for the beneficial holders. The trustee, of course,
is NaFine; it is a government entity, and thus a Mexican entity. The
certificates issued, the CPO's, are negotiable instruments under Mexican law
so they can be bought and sold and therefore give the holder liquidity.
Furthermore, in the United States we can issue ADR's against the CPO's.
Eventually you are issuing an American Depository Receipt in a Certificate
of Participation that in turn represents the ultimate shares in the company.
It seems a bit removed but it has worked well. Many significant Mexican
corporations, like Aeromexico, have gone into the market successfully in this
fashion. Again, these industries also restrict foreign ownership so they have
complied with Mexican law and foreign restrictions. They tap the capital
markets in ingenious ways. Mexico is a good example of what can be done
within a traditional legal framework to make the markets more liquid and
attract more foreign capital.
Moving on again to other countries, you see a pattern emerging
(following the Mexican example) in the sense of ingenuity and legal
engineering. Chile, for example, has been very successful in attracting
foreign capital. That movement started as far back as 1974. You will hear
a lot more about it from my friend Arturo Alessandri-Cohn. As early as
1974, Chile enacted Decree Law 600, its foreign investment law. That
statute is specifically directed at trying to attract foreign capital into Chilean
capital markets. Decree Law 600 was set up to make a substantial
investment in the Chilean capital markets. One enters into an investment
contract with the central bank of Chile to register their investment whenever
it starts. What does that get you? Well, it gets you many things. It gets you
a guarantee from the Chilean government that you will not be discriminated
against as a foreign investor. You will be treated in the same way as a
Chilean investor. It allows you to freely repatriate your dividends, the capital
gains, and the interest that the investment generates. There is a catch of
course - it is not all sweetness and light. You are committed to continue
to invest your capital in Chile for a three-year period once you have brought
it in. Currently, an amendment to Decree Law 600 is pending that would
reduce that period to one year, making it more attractive for foreigners to
come in. Nonetheless, investors have entered the Chilean market in
substantial numbers using these investment contracts with the Chilean
government.
The other advantage of using this Decree Law 600 is that it allows for
a flexible tax regime. It allows an investor to choose among the various
ways he or she wishes to be taxed, depending on what your Chilean taxes
will be in the future. For example, you can elect to be taxed at a fixed rate
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for the next ten years at 49.5%. Alternatively, you can take the regular rate
with the understanding that if the government raises the rates, you will have
to pay more. The current rate is about 35%, so you are taking a gamble that
they will not raise taxes in the foreseeable future. That is a typical way that
a foreigner puts his money into the Chilean capital markets, although it is an
elective procedure. It is something that is available to you. You can go in
and buy Chilean securities without signing an investment contract.
Obviously, you run the risk that you may not be able to get your money out,
but it is an advantage.
Chile also enacted a statute called Public Law 18567 in 1987. Public
Law 18567 is available to close down mutual funds and that is how most
mutual funds invest their money into Chile. Essentially, it allows you to
invest. It is really available to those who want to make a minimum
investment of one million dollars in the Chilean capital markets. Most
mutual funds will go well beyond one million dollars. You would invest
with a special-purpose Chilean management company and you must keep
your investments in Chile for a five-year period. You make a commitment
to maintain your investment for that length of time. The big benefit from all
of this is that you will be subject to a 10% tax rate. Thus, you will slash
your tax rate tremendously if you use Public Law 18567 in exchange for
maybe some long-term commitment on your part. I am getting those looks,
so I am only going to cover a little bit about Brazil because it is also a
significant market.
Brazil is another country that has tried, although I think less successfully
than Chile and Mexico, to attract foreign investments through changing its
laws and regulations. Brazil has a set of regulations called Annex 4.
Foreign investors can invest in the Brazilian stock exchange through it,
particularly through mutual funds. Brazil, which has had exchange control
problems and the like, has been less successful. The legal regime is there,
the spirit is there, but the flesh is weak in terms of the markets themselves.
Essentially, Brazil has set up via Annex 4 various alternatives for foreign
investors to come into Brazil. The most popular alternative is one called a
managed portfolio. With a managed portfolio, you contract with a Brazilian
domiciliary to be your advisor. A foreign institutional investor will directly
buy equities in the Brazilian securities market for you. Rather than
oversimplify this and mislead you, I am going to cut off there. Otherwise we
could go on and on. If you go across Latin America, you will see, as in the
good examples of Colombia and Venezuela, the great legislative liberalization
affecting how foreign investors can come into capital markets. For example,
in Venezuela, the old system required permission before you entered. Now,
you can register your investment upon entry and let them know what you are
doing later.
I think that, as a whole, Latin American countries have determined that
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the only way they will attract substantial foreign capital is to make it easier
legally for an investor to come in - less red tape and fewer systems of
permission. There is a cost to that, which is the increased liquidity. You can
put your money in easily and can take it out easily. On the whole, I think
they have become substantial beneficiaries. It is a great credit to these
countries that they have taken these steps to modify these long held statutes
and regulations and have been courageous enough to make that move. I
think it will pay substantial dividends in the years to come.
HERALCIO ATTENCIO: I think it is important to focus on the reason
capital markets in Latin America experienced a rebirth. There are many
fundamental reasons, but one principal reason is that banking interest rates
are so high that many private companies cannot pay. For example, today in
Venezuela the interest rate is almost 58% on a bank loan. They cannot pay
that high of an interest rate. Many companies have found an attractive
alternative: float their paper, whether it is bonds or shares in the capital
markets, and obtain funding in that respect from national savers. The only
responsibility is to pay a dividend if they have profits. In Venezuela, the
International Monetary Fund recommended a band between 10 to 60% in
which the interest rates could fluctuate. The average had been around 50%.
The band has just been increased to 70%. We will see banking interest rates
going up to probably 65 or 68%. Thus, you will probably find more people
that are in private enterprises going to the securities market instead of going
to the banks.
CARLOS MENDEZ-PE&ATE: I would like to make a comment on that.
Several points have been made, certainly by THE ECONOMIST, about the fact
that there are still some serious social conditions and other things, so that it
is not a completely rosy picture. A big problem that companies have in
Latin America, in terms of financing themselves, is the Eurobond market.
If you are a SEMEX or Bensemas, as in Venezuela, you want to use a big
company - one considered a blue-chip, if you will - that is in its home
turf and is beginning to be known. Barings or one of the other big research
houses for emerging markets are beginning to follow them. Yes, they can
float a Eurobond today if SEMEX can float a five-year Eurobond at 400 over
treasuries; that is 9%, and thus it is very easy for them to finance themselves
that way.
The big problem we have in Latin America right now is the second-tier
companies: similar companies, perhaps maybe with better financials, but
much smaller companies that do not have their shares on the exchange and
are not followed or known. That company's alternative is to borrow its
Cetes plus ten in Mexico today. Cetes plus ten is 28-day money at 27%. I
think our job, for those of us who believe in Latin America and want to see
it develop, is to bring down the cost of borrowing - the financial costs not so much for the blue-chips, which we all know will get access to the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss2/2

30

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8

Bertao: The New Latin American Economic Landscape: Emerging Market Capita

capital market, but for smaller companies. We must try to develop both
domestic and international market places, perhaps by using short-term
programs at first, such as commercial paper programs for these companies,
and then moving them up the scale, so that they can do Eurobonds and
ultimately permanent capital, like equity types of issues.
I think that is the great challenge of the 1990s for Latin America. I do
not think it is going to be enough to capitalize the top tier of Latin America,
just as it is not enough to have significant macroeconomic changes and not
have the social conditions of the people in each country improve. So that is
an important problem on financial cost: second tier companies that still do
not have any access to reasonable rates of funding for themselves, although
the macroeconomic conditions have improved in the area.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

SIEGFRIED MARKS: The two state oil companies in Venezuela and
Mexico are under severe capital constraints. Low oil prices and high tax
rates are leaving inadequate earnings for reinvestment to maintain the high
level of exploration, production, and development needed to preserve their
level of reserves, particularly in Mexico. My question is whether these state
oil companies are going to tap the local capital market since now these
capital markets are expanding internally? Are they going to tap them to
make up for the shortfall that amounts to about 1.5 billion dollars a year that
they need to spend in addition to what they have budgeted right now?
ANSWER: Venezuela has about three Eurobond issues in the market
currently and I believe that they are working on a number of issues now with
many large investment banks. The alternative - to deposit local currency
or Bolivar funding. in Venezuela - is really not workable for anybody.
Keep in mind that Bolivar inflation is still running very high, so that even a
top AAA name in Venezuela would still look at real dollar financing costs
in excess of 15% for short term money. Again, simply, the high interest rate
environment of the domestic fixed income markets and the very short nature
of the tenure of these instruments virtually closed those markets out, even to
the best names. Why should anyone go into the local market when they can
tap the Eurobond market at five years and receive substantial payouts. For
example, today they would probably be paying about 10.5% or 550 over the
comparable treasury.
There is an exception, of course, in Chile. Chile is the exception to
everything. In Chile, the privatization of the pension fund made the Chilean
stock market the most well-capitalized in Latin America. It represents almost
100% of the GDP. Also, the local fixed-income market interest rates are
5.5% in Chile. There is not enough borrowing. There are too many moneychasing borrowers in Chile today and that has been the situation for at least
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the last three years. So, except for Chile, there is really only one avenue that
even the best companies can use to finance themselves on a medium term
basis. That is the Euro-Market.
C.

Venezuela Country Update

6

R. PATE
Let me begin by saying how pleased I am to be with you today. I
appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the present situation in
Venezuela, Venezuela's recent political-economic history, and, thereafter, to
try to gaze into Venezuela's near to medium-term future. First, however, I
wish to say that Siegfried Marks surprised me when he said that even though
he is an economist, he wanted to emphasize the negative aspects of the
current Latin American scene. I thought that only we attorneys traditionally
give much of our attention to the downside risks. Second, in listening just
now to Carlos Berta6, it occurred to me how much more fortunate he has
been, given that he had two countries to cover, and so could choose the more
positive aspects of each to highlight. Unfortunately in this respect, I can only
speak about Venezuela, to which I now turn.
The current year is likely to be one of the most critical in Venezuela's
modem history. The immediate reason for this: the presidential and
congressional elections that are supposed to be held in early December 1993.
The outcome of these elections, including how they are held, may well
determine whether Venezuela will continue, or to what extent it will
continue, with the, IMF structural readjustment/economic liberalization
program it began to implement in 1989. Also, the election may determine
whether the country will deviate back towards statist/interventionist
governmental policies. Such policies would impact on the socioeconomic
harmony of Venezuelan society and, thus, on the democratic regime in place
during the last thirty-three years.
As time is short for this update of the Venezuelan situation and its
prognosis, I wish to focus on three elements: the economy, the political
scene, and the climate for private business. To facilitate the presentation of
this overview, I first wish to briefly describe the situation in each of these
three areas from the beginning of the present administration of Carlos Andrrs
Perez in early 1989. Then, I will address possible future trends or scenarios
ineach area.
Things have gotten better in Venezuela in the last few years, but
JOHN
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unfortunately things have recently taken a bit of a downturn. Just to
summarize quickly, when Carlos Andrts Perez came into office in 1989, he
found a country that was bankrupt in economic policies and in foreign
exchange. He realized there were not many alternatives other than to change
policies in a way that would be attractive to potential investment. The
primary source of this investment, at least initially, was from the international
financial organizations in Washington. That is essentially what we have
done. He chose an economic team initially from the graduate business
school which I was associated with once upon a time. What they could do
without requiring congressional support, they did fairly quickly. Therefore,
the policy framework in Venezuela has changed very dramatically in a very
short period. A few of the principle changes that were implemented right
away include: the exchange rate was unified; the exchange system was
decontrolled; most of the subsidies were eliminated; the external tariff
structure was significantly lowered and simplified; nearly all restrictions on
foreign investment and other investment barriers were removed; the price
control structure that was in place was largely eliminated; the economy was
greatly debureaucratized; order was brought to public finances; foreign debt
was restructured; the income tax system was modified and taxes were
considerably lowered; privatization of state entities was begun; the decentralization of the government was begun; Venezuela joined GATT, the Andean
Pact, and other Latin American integration movements; and, finally, we
promulgated some antitrust and environmental controls and other commercial
regulatory-type legislation.
However, political parties have not been adequately reformed. Because
of them, the Congress has not done its part. Various other components of the
IMF structural adjustment program that require congressional support have
not been there. Some things that Venezuela has not done, and part of the
reason the country is in the situation it is, include: an unwillingness to create
mechanisms to raise revenues from non-petroleum sources; an unwillingness
to reach agreement in permitting private investment in basic industries
including mining; a lack of reform in the financial sector; an unwillingness
to go forward in privatization; an unwillingness to modernize labor
legislation; an unwillingness to enact and implement judicial reforms; an
unwillingness to crack down on governmental corruption; and, finally, an
unwillingness to remit electoral reforms to achieve representative democracy
and a greater degree of governmental decentralization.
Despite these factors, the initial opening allowed the country to develop
rather dramatically, especially in the last four years. 1989 was a year of
great readjustment, with negative growth, very high inflation, and significant
devaluation. It was followed by three years of very positive growth that
made the country look as if it might be on the road to self-sustaining
development. However, there were some political clouds on the horizon
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starting in early February 1989. After some significant rise, there were two
failed coup attempts last year.
Nonetheless, in the 1990-92 period Venezuela had one of the highest
growth rates in the world. It grew in effect at well over 20%. Last year the
total GDP grew by over 7%, with the private sector contribution in the GDP,
at 13.7%, being the highest in Venezuela's history. Unfortunately, that is
now ending. Things are beginning to turn down, and one can criticize the
President for not having provided the kind of political leadership that should
have been provided. One thing was to have chosen some bright fellows to
come to agreements with the IMF and implement, at the administrative level,
some necessary structural changes. But we have not had political cooperation. There has been no political movement at the congressional level, nor
has the public supported the various policies required.
Turning to the business climate, if one could isolate it from the economic
conditions and political prognosis of the country, I would say that Venezuela
now has an extremely inviting business climate. There are very few
restrictions, and the costs, including taxes, are quite low. It is a land of
reasonable opportunity, both in terms of domestic demand and of international opportunities. This is largely because in the early years of this administration, all the foreign investment, price, import-export, foreign exchange,
establishment, value added, and similar distorting regulations and restrictions
were removed or significantly reduced. There are a few major exceptions
still, in part because the Congress has not cooperated, but also because the
whole body politic has not come around. The most significant of these is the
reform of the financial sector. The financial sector, both banks and
insurance, are still closed to outside investment and remain mired in the
earlier restrictive policies. Basic petroleum sector activities and certain other
basic industries remain dominated primarily by the heavy state industries
under the control of the Guyanan Corporation, the CBG, which includes the
steel, aluminum, electricity, and to some extent, the mining sectors.
There are several factors that affect the private economy. First (and
somewhat ironically), the liberal, free trade economic policies that created a
climate for commercial infrastructural activity known as the commercial
mode simultaneously have largely discouraged truly productive, less
export-oriented investment. This excludes a few areas where Venezuela
could attempt to realize comparative advantages, mainly petro-chemicals and
some agricultural activities. Some other areas where there has been some
movement, such as tourism, are so minor that they are not significant in
macroeconomic terms. Second, the paternalistic and socialistic labor laws,
characterized by the highly negative feature of retroactive labor indemnities,
have geometrically increased the cost of labor to employers. This encouraged terrible management-labor relations. High turnover, low wages, and
antagonistic unionism persist. Third, there was (and is) general political
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instability. I am referring not just to the current macropolitical climate, but
also to continuing instability in business economic conditions. There is still
no pattern of foreseeable rational change that anyone can count on. Fourth,
I will list traditional legal insecurity, which continues to be widespread. Too
often the judicial system has lent itself to abuses of unfair and partial judicial
proceedings, largely undermining confidence in the nation's judicial system,
and indeed in the whole system of law. Also, we have insecurity in a
broader sense: corruption at different levels and poor police protection.
Security at the street level is getting worse, including an increase in street
violence.
While most of the lawmaking or legislative activity in this government
has been to simplify life and get rid of some regulations, there are few things
worth mentioning on the affirmative side. One is some reform in the tax
area. In 1991 there was a significant reform in the income tax code,
substantially reducing taxes, simplifying taxes, and modernizing taxes on the
income side. Similarly, one failure on the macroeconomic level has been to
replace the income tax code to come up with new non-petroleum,
revenue sources. The country has balked at implementing value-added taxes,
sales taxes, or any other suggestions to enhance domestic savings, or to avoid
the tremendous deficits that are driving the economy down and placing the
financial sector in a highly chaotic state.
This cannot continue forever. We are in an electoral year. People say
after this year things will change, but that remains to be seen. There has
been some modernization that I have mentioned in the area of commercial
norms in general. We have some anti-trust policies, anti-dumping policies,
fair trade and consumer protection policies, all of which are just beginning
to be applied and applied somewhat gingerly. At least they are on the books.
One of the more significant areas worth mentioning is that of economic
integration - trade within the region. Perez was always very much of a prointegrationist, very much the leader in this area. His wings were clipped a
bit after the February coup attempt. He was grounded, not allowed to leave
the country for a while. Nonetheless, Venezuela is very much at the
forefront of the current rejuvenation of the Andean Pact, the Group of Three,
and all the other things that are going on. This is certainly positive in
Venezuela's case for two reasons. First, some normative initiatives that come
out of these organizations are reinforcing the policy changes within the
country. Perhaps some of those policy changes will make them more stable
than they might otherwise be. Also, Latin America probably offers
Venezuela the best opportunity for non-traditional exports in the future,
traditionally an area of tremendous weakness, as Siegfried and others have
commented. This is an area that has been unfortunately neglected as part of
the overall program.
Let me now turn to Venezuela's future prospects. The short-term
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prognosis of the Venezuelan economy is fair to poor. It depends on how the
government controls spending and liquidity this year. It also depends on
whether any breakthroughs occur in the critical areas of revenue mechanisms
permitting foreign capital to enter the petroleum sector and continue with
large-scale privatizations, particularly in the electricity sector and some CVG
basic industries. In 1993, the prognosis is still for some growth, perhaps 3%,
but maybe as high as 4%. The growth will be fueled primarily by still-active
commercial manufacturing in the domestic market, especially construction,
which is probably boosted by a fair degree of drug money being laundered
through the economy. Inflation should heat up to over 40%, maybe in the
mid-40s. It could go higher, despite the government's rather modest attempts
to control deficit spending and absorb liquidity by pushing up interest rates.
The new cap will be over 70% and could go even higher. It is now pegged
to the zero-coupon bond rates, which are set by the market, but it is twenty
points, two thousand basis points, above that. Without new tax revenues this
year, the budget deficit could again be over 6% of the GDP, as it was in
1991. The trade balance will, again as in 1992, be over four billion dollars
in the red. About 7% of GDP and the current account deficit will be very
much in the red. Liquid reserves will shrink to the eight to nine billion
dollar range, or about seven months of imports. Official unemployment is
expected to remain low, in part because it is an official figure, but still over
8% due to construction activity. This unemployment figure is largely
meaningless, because, as even the government recognizes, over 40% of the
work force is engaged solely in the informal economy. Very little is known
about that segment. It is also worth noting that over 30% of the population
is deemed to be living at below subsistence level. Because of the excessive
budget deficits in 1991-92 and, of course, investor remedial actions taken this
year, 1994 is likely to be similar to 1989 as another year of adjustment, with
sharp cutbacks in government spending, relatively high inflation, steep
devaluation, and leading to at least a short-term recession. Thereafter, what
happens to the economy will depend on the traditional exogenous factors:
commodity prices for oil and to a lesser extent for aluminum; decisions by
the Venezuelan government regarding questions of investment in the areas
in which Venezuela could have comparative advantages; and generally
continuation in perfecting the open competitive economic model.
The key element in this scenario is the fact that Venezuela has almost
nowhere else to turn for funding. The funding from Washington, the World
Bank, the IDB, and the IMF, has largely dried up at this stage under prior
agreements. Venezuela is not welcome in the international capital markets.
They broke the taboo a couple years ago of allowing Pedebesa to go to the
capital market, but Pedebesa currently has an external debt of around four
billion dollars (it is scheduled to increase by another billion by the end of
this year). Now they are talking about selling non-essential assets, whatever
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those are. Within the next six months or so, they are. hoping to be able to
begin selling off about three billion dollars of assets from Pedebesa. I would
suggest that the one and a half billion shortfall that you mentioned is a
modest figure. They need more. We can talk about oil later on. They need
more over the medium term in order to continue necessary production levels.
But Venezuela needs to go further. Alarmingly, especially in this
context, given the current political currents, the political situation could again
turn more nationalistic, protectionistic, and generally close-minded. Such a
shift would most likely have a highly deleterious effect in the medium to
short term future. It is based on the current political situation. In the current
political scenario, we are supposed to have presidential and national
congressional elections this December. At this moment it is not clear
whether we will have elections, how the elections will be held, or whether
they will be held in December. All of these things have been discussed.
Putting the electoral system aside, the Congress is now examining the
possibility of modifying the current suffrage law, the election law. This is
in part a reflection of what happened last December when we had gubernatorial and municipal elections, some of which are still being disputed. There
are at least two governorships that are still up in the air. The process is now
more open, going back three years earlier when we had gubernatorial and
municipal elections for the first time in Venezuela's thirty-three-year
democratic history. Those were the first direct elections in Venezuela for any
public officials other than the President of the Republic. Last December's
elections highlighted the degree of electoral fraud, the degree of non-election
party participation in the elections, which has caused some of the heightened
tension that exists at the moment. It has led to the situation where the
electoral system is a bit open to question, including some of the declarations
by the current president of the electoral council, who suggests that if the
system is not modified after the next election the country could be on the
verge of a civil war. Under the current political system, the Congress would
be half elected directly, that is, half the members of the Congress would be
elected directly by name, and the other half would be designated on the basis
of party proportionality. Previously, all the congressmen were simply chosen
on the basis of party slate. There are mass movements, mass petition
movements, asking the Congress to modify the suffrage law, to open the
election entirely to a 100% direct election of Congress, but the parties are
unlikely to go that far. In fact, at the moment it is probably unlikely they
will make any modification at all. There may be a compromise to one-third
or two-thirds.
At the moment, it looks as if there may be as many as four principal
contenders for the presidency, and I would judge five or six principle
tendencies or movements behind congressional candidates. Very quickly to
recap, the Christian Democratic Party (COPAY) would appear to be the new
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majority party at the moment, based on last December's gubernatorial and
municipal elections. However, this is relative because many of the COPAY
candidates were also backed by the Socialist party, the Mass (the Morimiento
Socialismo), and COPAY has never had the grass roots organization of the
traditional Mass party, that is the public party of the Social Democrats, the
AD party. At the moment in COPAY there are probably two principal
contenders. Eduardo Fernandez, who was the presidential candidate the last
time around, has been the Secretary General to the party and has presently
taken leave from that post. His principle rival is Oswaldo Aborispaz, the
rather popular governor who was recently re-elected by a large majority of
the state of Zulio. The AD party at the moment is significantly weakened
and divided. It has gone through a number of divisions, scandals, and so on.
There are at least half a dozen potential pre-candidates at the moment. In my
estimate, there are three who are reasonably strong within the party. I would
list Carmelo Lauria, whose was in the first administration of Carlos Andres
back in the mid-1970s. He was a key figure in the Bocinche administration
and is close to some of the central members of the party, but he is disliked
by some of the other central members of the party. A second "presienciable"
is Claudio Fromin, who was the AD Mayor of Caracas before he was
defeated last December by Accause-Herre, one of the fourth group I will
mention in a moment. Four days after the change of government, after a
series of corruption charges, he and the Municipal Controller and several
other officials ended up spending forty-five days in jail. He was just released
last Tuesday. Now he has gone off and registered as a pre-candidate. But
he is very charismatic and a populist who clearly will make waves. The
third individual I will mention is Carlos Grachimato, an old lion orthodox,
who is the founder of the AD party. He is picking up support, but again
from the old line of the party. The fourth political force of the moment is
Raphael Caldera. Cadera was the COPAY founder and is an ex-president.
He currently leads the popularity polls among all politicians. Given the fact
that Venezuela does not have a runoff system, a second round to require
someone to have a majority, he could very well end up again as the president
with a very significant minority.
Presumably, there are only four candidates, so one only needs 26% of the
votes to win. Caldera, now seventy-seven and eased out of COPAY by the
order of Fernandez, is increasingly becoming a populist and has drawn
support from the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party may well designate him
as its official candidate. The fourth potentially viable candidate is a younger
radical labor leader, Andres Velasquez, the labor union based "calsa-R."
Three years ago Velasquez was elected governor of Bolivar State which is
dominated by the CVG. This is sort of a surprise in itself, except that he
came from the steel sector union there and last December was overwhelmingly re-elected. It also is significant that another of his party was elected
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mayor of Caracas last December with a majority of the city council.
On the congressional side, suffice it to know that provided there is any
degree of direct election of representatives, almost assuredly this will work
to reduce the number of congressmen from the traditional parties. Thus, the
new Congress should be considerably more diversified, including an
increased number of representatives from the Socialist Party, the Council R,
as well as local and regional parties and independent movements, of which
there are a tremendous number. One of the more positive things that has
been going on in Latin America in general, and in Venezuela in particular,
in recent years is the political opening. There has been a real political
awakening, an ongoing democratic revolution.
The COPAY candidates, Alvaro Paz and Eduardo Fernandez, are about
the only candidates who have been bold enough to support the IMF structural
adjustment orientation and try to defend it. All of the other candidates are
speaking in more protectionist, more nationalist, conservative, throwback-tothe-old-days sort of terms, calling for everything from all kinds of artificial
distortions and increases and decreases in controls and so on. What is likely
to happen is that if one of the COPAY candidates comes through we can
probably expect some continuation almost regardless of what will happen in
Congress. There will probably be continued reform, as there should be.
That is going to depend a lot on the Congress. On the other hand, if any of
the others come up, we most assuredly are going to see backsliding.
Just to finalize here, the business prospects, the business outlook for the
present time, can only be described as expectant. There is a wait-and-see
attitude prevailing, with many productive sector investments simply on hold.
However, this varies to some extent by different sectors and the nature of the
economic activity. The kinds of productive sector projects that are going
forward and may continue are a few of the joint ventures with the state
related to certain natural resources such as the petro-chemical area, the
exploitation of the Orito Pine Forest, the CVG project, and the coal
exploration in Wasaure. Pedebesa will continue with some projects at a very
reduced rate. On the other hand, I think we will see this year parapatetic
activity in the petroleum sectors. The government will try to sign more
letters and initial agreements in two areas of activity, one in secondary
recovery and the other in the so-called association agreements that still have
to be defined. I am afraid, however, that nothing more will come of this.
The association agreements in particular require some sort of congressional
action, and that remains to be defined. The principal fear of businessmen,
of course, will be the reimposition of controls or restrictions of any type, and
then secondly the question of legal security and all of its various ramifications.
In my view, what really is going to mark the key for Venezuela in the
near-term future and the long-term future will be the oil sector. Venezuela,
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despite all of its other resources and potential advantages, is still an oil
country. If things do not work there, privatization, the opening up of the
financial sector, and everything else will not mean very much. The business
environment has changed dramatically in Venezuela in the last few years, but
it remains extremely vulnerable to macroeconomic and macropolitical
considerations. Venezuela is also vulnerable simply for socio-economic
reasons: the welfare of nearly twenty-five million inhabitants has continued
to decline rather than to improve during the last decade. The decisions of
both the political elites regarding the electoral system and the masses
regarding the electoral outcome will be critical in determining whether
Venezuela will be able to turn the comer toward sustained development or
continue to be mired in its current problems of underdevelopment.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

GEORGE A. FOLSOM: Could you expand a little bit on the negotiation of
a free trade agreement between Venezuela and Colombia? It is my
understanding that such a bilateral pact is more likely to succeed than the
Andean Pact.
JOHN R. PATE: The relationship between Venezuela and Colombia has
lately become quite dynamic. Beginning last year, Venezuela and Colombia
essentially entered into a customs union with almost total free trade between
the two countries and with a nearly universal common external tariff. It is
still a new initiative and many bilateral matters need to be worked out, yet
it will be essential to achieve macroeconomic policy coordination in order to
create a truly integrated market. It is significant that the economic leaders
on both sides share a considerable similarity of views. The principal
ministers meet frequently, recently about every couple of months. Also,
there are continual meetings going on at various technical levels. Moreover,
the market is truly integrating and there has been a lot of crossed investment,
although this has not entailed much money so far.
Arthur D. Little did a study that showed that since the opening up of the
market, there have been 161 Colombian investments in Venezuela, but only
thirty or so Venezuelan investments in Colombia. At the same time, other
signs are encouraging. For example, air traffic between Caracas and Bogota
has increased 600% since the beginning of last year. Presumably, this will
lead to a greater degree of contact between the two countries and so facilitate
further agreements.
GEORGE A. FOLSOM: What is the level of tariffs now between the two
countries? Is it the same for Ecuador and Peru?
JOHN R. PATE: The tariff level for intra-Andean trade is essentially the
same for all of the countries and to a large extent the Andean Pact is now
basically a free trade area. However, not all products are included,
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particularly those that were originally reserved for sectoral programming, or
that were not produced, or that fell into any of the other sensitive categories.
On the other hand, the Andean Pact continues to have difficulty with the
proposed common external tariff. This mechanism has essentially been
adopted now by Colombia and Venezuela, but it should be noted that
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia continue to have significant differences regarding
it.
FRANSCISO M. CASTILLO: I would like to congratulate John for his
accurate and comprehensive report. However, I think one aspect that we
have to mention in the area of business prospects for Venezuela is the mining
sector. At this moment in Venezuela, the mining sector is experiencing a
"gold rush." Several Canadian companies are investing millions of dollars
acquiring exploration and exploitation rights in the Guyana region. This is
mainly due to the recent change in the income tax law that reduced the tax
rate for the mining sector from 60% to 30%. It also is important to
emphasize that foreign investment is allowed in the mining sector. Hence,
John's comments on continued restrictions in the mining area should be
interpreted as mainly affecting the basic industries of aluminum and steel,
and not such subsectors as gold and diamonds.
JOHN R. PATE: Thank you, Francisco, for that clarification, about which
you are quite correct. However, I would point out that investors in mining
activities other than the basic sectors still face considerable judicial
uncertainty, given that the long-promised reforms of the mining laws,
together with the resolution of other political complexities at both the
national and state level, so far remain undetermined. Accordingly, while I
recognize that several major foreign mining companies have been expending
considerable sums to acquire concession rights, at the same time I would
continue to counsel caution, at least until more inviting and modem
legislation has been enacted. The mere fact that a reform of the mining law
has been delayed for so many years is indicative that the political leaders in
the country are far from achieving a political consensus regarding a policy
approach in this area.

D. Colombia Country Update
DARIO CARDENAS-NAVAS

7

Thanks, first of all to the Florida Bar for the opportunity to speak today,
and also to have the chance to talk about Colombia in a different way from
the one you hear everyday in the news - to show that Colombia is more

7. Dario Cardenas-Navas has been a member of the Colombian Bar since 1966. He
received his Doctor in Law and Jurisprudence from Colegin Mayor de Nuestra Sefiora del
Rosario and his Master of Laws from Tulane University.
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than a cocaine producing country. As I will explain later on, the situation in
Colombia is completely different from what you see in the news. Now I will
go over the changes that have recently taken place in Colombia.
First, a completely new constitution was enacted in July 1991. Initially,
the idea was to introduce only some amendments to the existing constitution
from 1986, but later it was decided to have a whole new constitution. Many
changes were introduced and only through time will we be able to understand
all of the changes that took place. But I am going to highlight some of these
changes, which are already changing the legal environment in Colombia.
The office of the general attorney was created for the purpose of
investigating crimes and prosecuting suspects. The current and first general
attorney, Dr. Gustavo de Greiff, has been very active in this work and is
really contributing to the moralization of the country. He was appointed for
a period of four years by the Supreme Court of Colombia, chosen out of
three candidates nominated by the president, and cannot be re-appointed.
Another substantial change was the creation of a Constitutional Court.
In the past, all constitutional matters were resolved by the Supreme Court.
Now, there is a separate constitutional court that has members appointed by
the Senate for a period of eight years. They cannot be re-appointed. The
Bill of Rights list was expanded, and now all types of rights are protected by
the Constitution, including environmental rights, collective rights, cultural
rights, and others. There is an action called Tutela, similar to Amparo in
Mexico, which is an action available to any person before any judge when
no other remedy is available and a fundamental right is in immediate
jeopardy. We lawyers in Colombia are studying this new Tutela action
because it is really a new avenue that is always available.
The people's direct involvement in government has been expanded
because now not only is the president elected by popular vote, but also the
governors of the different states and the mayors of all municipalities. This
is in addition, of course, to the senators and representatives. It is now
possible for the Congress to ask a minister to resign. If the minister does not
resign, the minister can be terminated.
The central bank also was changed. It now has the authority for
monetary exchange, credit, and the monitoring of international reserves. In
the past, a monetary board fulfilled these functions. The central bank has
seven members, including the minister of finance and the general manager
of the central bank. The members are elected for eight years.
The election of the president, from now on, is going to take place in two
different voting rounds. In the past, we used to have only one round. Most
probably, this will favor the majority party, the Liberal party, because in the
past the conservatives came to power when the Liberal party was divided.
Now they will have the opportunity in the second round to work together
with one candidate.
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The position of vice-president was created. The vice-president also will
be elected by popular vote. There will probably now be coalitions between
liberal and conservative parties (and other parties). In the past, this was not
possible. It is suspected that this may change the electoral results. Colombia
will continue to have a Senate and Chamber of Representatives, although the
Senate is now limited to 100 members.
One dramatic change that took place was the prohibition of extradition.
That was a very controversial issue. Everyone knows why it was controversial, but at the end of the day it was prohibited.
In addition to these constitutional reforms, Colombia passed several
decrees and regulations to try to restructure the government to make it more
efficient. Several entities and companies have been eliminated, and, for
example, the role of the superintendency of companies is now much more
relaxed and deregulated. Companies can now do many things that before
needed the approval of the superintendency.
As for economic developments, at the end of the presidency of Virgilio
Barco, the economy of the country began to open, ending Colombia's
isolationism. When President Cesar Gaviria took office in August 1990, he
adopted a program covering foreign investment, foreign trade, privatization,
labor efficiency, elimination of subsidies, and so forth. I will individually
discuss the parts of the program to give you an idea of the changes.
First, foreign trade changed. The number of attorneys involved was
dramatically reduced, as well as the need for an import permit. In the past,
it was very difficult to obtain an import permit. Now it is very easy.
However, Colombian manufacturers have been faced with foreign competition. Except for a few cases, major companies have had to close down
because of the opening up of the country. Regardless of all that, the
economy grew 36% last year, in spite of the power-generating crisis and
terrorism that Colombia still faces. In the area of foreign investment, I gave
several presentations earlier with my friend John, explaining all of the
approvals, restrictions, and conditions which the Colombian government used
to require of foreign investors, so now I will be brief.
Generally, foreign investors do not need approval to invest in Colombia.
However, investments must be recorded with the central bank. Approvals are
only needed for areas such as public utilities, communications, the financial
sector, and the oil and mining industry. However, they are easy to obtain.
No foreign investment is allowed in national defense and to secure disposal
of toxic or radioactive waste. A company called Coinvertir was created last
year by the government with a purpose of promoting foreign investment in
Colombia. That company is a mixed entity with both government and
private sector participation. It is too early to tell if it is going to work or not.
In 1992, the foreign investment was 722 million dollars, increasing 67% from
1991, mainly in oil, the financial sector, and construction.
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There is no restriction requiring the repatriation of profit. It is also
possible to make investments in the stock exchange through foreign investment funds. There are some restrictions as to the amount of shares that can
be owned by those funds, but those restrictions can be circumvented through
the prior approval of the superintendency of the securities.
The exchange control regulations were changed considerably and now
only foreign trade, foreign investment, foreign debt, and royalties are under
control. Control means that all payments or transactions must occur through
a commercial bank in Colombia. However, there is a completely free trade
of dollars. There is no longer an official rate of exchange, but a floating rate
known as the representative market rate. Therefore, no exchange license is
required from the central bank in order to purchase any dollars. The
exchange license used to be quite a problem and scared off many creditors
and foreign investors.
Colombian residents may now keep accounts with foreign banks abroad.
Foreign loans are permitted, with certain restrictions as to the nature of the
lender. For example, in working capital loans, the lender has to be a
financial institution. The government's policy of having integrated loan
facilities has changed. The government is trying to have each government
entity obtain its own financing rather than having the government acquire a
larger loan package. Currently, the republic is going to issue 100 million
Euro-bonds.
Employment regulations also were relaxed. It is now easier to engage
and terminate personnel without paying indemnification. In the technology
transfer area, Colombia used to have a very strict royalty committee with a
multitude of requirements and policies, limiting the amount of royalties to be
paid. This can be avoided by making a simple filing with Incomex.
Incomex will generally only reject the request in three cases: 1) if the
licensor determines the price at which the goods are to be sold; 2) if it is the
obligation of the licensee to transfer to the licensor any inventions or patents
the licensee makes; and, 3) if it limits the possibility of exporting products
to any country. The third ground for rejection by Incomex is a problem
because many multinational companies have a policy of limiting a license to
a given country.
In Colombia, privatization has taken place in railroads, ports, and
banking, and is taking place in communications. Banco de los Trabajadores
was acquired by Banco Mercantil de Venezuela as a consequence of bidding
processes. Banco Tequendama also was sold in the bidding process to Banco
de la Construcci6n from Venezuela and Banco del Comercio was bought and
merged by Banco de Bogota, a Colombian bank. There was a very serious
strike in the telecommunications sector because the government wanted to
privatize TELECOM, the public telecommunications company.
The
government avoided privatization by authorizing government entities to
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associate themselves with private companies. Thus, there are already joint
ventures in the telecommunications area.
There are economic indicators which may illuminate Colombia's
situation. The devaluation in 1992 was approximately 6% and the inflation
rate was 25%. The target for 1993 is 22% inflation. Economic growth is
expected to be 4.5 to 5%. The external debt of the country is 14 million
dollars, and it is expected that it will only increase by 100 million dollars.
The foreign reserves of the country are around 7.9 billion, and it is expected
that by 1993 they will be around 750 billion. As for taxes, there has been
criticism that, although Colombia is open to foreign investment, there are no
real tax incentives for foreign investors to enter. In some cases, there is
discrimination and foreign investors end up paying more taxes than
Colombians. The value-added tax of 14% on almost all activities is new.
The filing of income taxes has been simplified. Now one just has to file
their income tax return with a commercial bank and eventually the tax
authorities will review their income tax return.
Politically, economically, and socially, President Gaviria is now in his
thirteenth year and he will finish this term in August 1994. Still around are
the same problems which Colombia has faced for several years, such as:
guerilla activity, narcotics trafficking, and narco-terrorism. President Gaviria
had a very serious setback politically when Pablo Escobar escaped from jail
I think he escaped the very first day he was in jail - because after all the
investigations the government made, Escobar was not really in jail. In any
case, the present situation is that he is about (they have been saying "about"
for several months already) to surrender. First, Pablo Escobar was dictating
the terms upon which he would surrender. Now, apparently he is willing to
surrender. This is the result of the work of a government search group of
army and police troops. They have been quite successful in either killing or
capturing most of Escobar's men. In addition, there is a group called the
"PEPPES," the Pereguidas Por Pablo Escobar, a group of former partners of
Escobar in the drug business that used to work with Escobar. Pablo Escobar
apparently killed some of them, and the survivors, the PEPPES, are after him.
Thus, between the government and the PEPPES, Escobar is really in trouble.
The guerrilla activity problem has really been attacked by the government. The government has spent lots of money in equipment and weapons,
so it appears that Colombia may change. It does not appear that Colombia
can eliminate the drug problem, but at least the guerrilla problem is changing.
A minister of defense has said publicly that in eighteen months the guerrillas
will be out of business. That remains to be seen.
The future president of the country will be difficult to predict now. It
appears that Pastrana, the son of former President Pastrana, might win,
although Ernesto Samper of the Liberal Party is another possibility. There
are, however, other independent candidates such as Navarro from the former
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guerilla group M-19, and Carlos Yeres de la Fuentes, the son of another
president, who might prevail.
I am optimistic, we are optimistic in Colombia. We are not scared of
living in Colombia, we are happy in Colombia. Security is always a
problem, but we are in Colombia to stay.
QUESTION AND ANSWER

PAUL E. MASON: Dr. Cardenas, please clarify the technology transfer
agreements that you mentioned. You stated that these agreements would be
accepted unregistered by the government unless they contained certain
clauses, and your paper said something similar. Is it that the agreements
would be refused if they contained any one of the clauses mentioned? Or all
of the clauses? Or some combination of the clauses?
DARIO CARDENAS: The agreement would be refused if it contained any
one of those clauses.
PAUL E. MASON: Is the president of Colombia the president for one term
only?
DARIO CARDENAS: Yes, the president can only serve for one term and
cannot be re-elected.
CARLOS BERTkO: One of the issues concerning foreign investments is
that there is a lack of good, effective administration of justice. What is being
done in Venezuela and Colombia about this problem?
JOHN PATE: In Venezuela, not very much is being done. It is an issue
that has been greatly debated. Venezuela adopted the current liberal
economic program, emerging as a pilot country in Latin America for World
Bank financing with judicial reform. Congressional approval is required, as
part of -a public credit law, before money can come into the country.
Collaboration with the judicial council is required. Because of political
turmoil, not much is happening. On the more positive side, there was
movement a couple of years ago at the level of the Bar Association in
Caracas; the good guys took it over again and things are improving slightly
there. Unfortunately, aside from a lot of public noise, there is not much
action. I would defer to Francisco Castillo to comment on that. But as a
general proposition, it is a concern, a necessity, but it is part of the political
game.
DARIO CARDENAS: First, in Colombia, the government increased the
salaries of the judges, which were really very low, in an effort to make the
judges more independent. Second, the Attorney General, whom I mentioned
before, is really concerned about moralizing the whole legal system in
Colombia. Third, in addition to a court copyright, the Acci6n de Tutela
helps to preserve the administration of justice. All of these, I believe, will
help in improving our justice, but of course there is much to be done.
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